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I.  Introduction
A.  Purpose of the Study
US-American Cities have gained experiences with urban development partnerships since the
Urban Renewal Program in the 1950’s. The partnership model is a widespread and overall
used approach in urban development in the US and has affected particularly development in
Central Business Districts (CBDs) for around 40 years. The purpose of this study is to
examine partnership approaches in urban renewal and urban development projects in the US.
The study looks at how important public-private partnerships have been in city planning and
how they have affected urban revitalization in the US. In the first chapter I discuss the reasons
for public-private partnership building in the US while taking social, political, and economic
circumstances into account. In the second part the analysis attempt to define distinct types of
partnerships that have developed since their emergence in the 1950s and particularly in the
boost years in the 1980s.
To develop an understanding of public-private partnerships in the US, it is useful and
necessary to explore the forms these processes have taken, their legal structure, primary
sources of funding, and their leadership arrangements. This leads to consideration of specific
strategies and planning tools that have been used by development partnerships. The study
attempts to catalog specific partnership activities. The proposed classification of public-
private partnerships is based on three factors that strongly reflect different types of
development partnerships to my mind. The first component, and in many respects foremost, is
the involvement of the public sector regarding financing of specific partnership projects and
provision of financial or not primarily financial incentives in order to attract private
investment. A second factor refers to the organizational structure of partnerships in terms of
formal agreements. Third, chief objectives of cooperative efforts including partnerships
spatial foci are considered as well.
The third part of this paper represents the empirical part of the research. Here, partnership
approaches in three cities in Southern California are analyzed. In this regard, public-private
cooperation caused by redevelopment and the Business Improvement District program (BID)
are discussed. The objective of the latter chapter of the study is to provide a summary of the
research. Beside a summary of the results of this study I attempt to highlight new trends in
public-private partnership approaches in urban development based on literature research and
interviews with city staffers.
B.  Methodology
To discuss the complex subject of public-private partnerships in urban development, I review
US-American literature in the first part of my study. As the examined term public-private
partnership is defined by different scholars in a different way, I have to define terms precisely,
so as to proceed with a common vocabulary.
For the empirical part of my study I chose Santa Ana, San Diego and Los Angeles as case
studies. Whereas San Diego and Los Angeles are big cities in Southern California, Santa Ana
is a medium-sized city with over 300.000 people. Hence, it is intriguing to compare
partnership strategies in urban development in different types of cities. Since I didn’t get
sufficient data and information from the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency
(CRA) about partnership projects and activities, I focused my research on Santa Ana and San
Diego.4
As follows from my research description, the evaluation of statistical data is not pertinent to
my study but the examination of complex procedures and specific strategies. That explains
why I primarily used qualitative research methods for my research. The research methods
encompass reviewing of documents, development agreements and other contracts, self-
projections, and analyses. Furthermore, I conducted interviews with city staffers and a
developer pertinent to my project. Additionally, I drew up a questionnaire to Business
Associations in order to get information and data on Business Improvement Districts (BIDs).
Since public-private partnership is not a precisely defined planning procedure, the examined
development projects and methods tend to be different and therefore require a explanation in
advance.
II. Partnership Models in the United States
Public-private partnerships may be found in all sizes and varieties of US-American cities.
Public-private partnerships were critical for the rebuilding of downtown in virtually all big
cities. Cities without partnerships are now the exception rather than the rule. The highly
visible downtown redevelopment projects in the US were sponsored by partnerships including
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, New York and so forth. Public-private partnerships have
increasingly been perceived as key for urban revitalization in U.S. cities. Wagner, Joder and
Mumphrey, for example, conclude in their research about development strategies in central
city revitalization that public-private partnerships are one of the main factors that are
advisable for successful central city revitalization (Wagner, F. W.; Joder, T. E.; Mumphrey,
A. J., 2000). Baltimore’s Charles Center/Inner Harbor development is frequently cited as a
model of public-private partnership and public entrepreneurship (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich
1989). Both projects are “massive downtown urban renewal projects” (CED, 1978:220)
jointly planned and constructed by the City of Baltimore and the business community.
Responsibility for planning and implementation was divided  between the two sectors. The
partnership for management and marketing of the projects were institutionalized through  the
Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc., a project-orientated private nonprofit
corporation.
A.  Reasons for Partnership building in Urban Development and Evolution of
the Partnership Idea
To describe the evolution of public-private partnerships, it is useful to discuss distinct periods
of development in conjunction with overall urban development trends. In the first part of this
section I intent to discuss the emergence of public-private cooperation in the context of
general urban development trends. Subsequently, I deal with significant urban policy tacks
that contributed to public-private partnership building.
After World War II fundamental changes of urban social and economic patterns were taking
place and affected the development of cities substantially. The deindustrialization struck
many cities particularly those in the rustbelt while at the same time laying the groundwork for
public-private cooperation. But public-private partnerships are not only a phenomenon in
rustbelt cities but in sunbelt cities as well. Here they have been a significant component of
urban growth. A far-reaching suburbanization process began in US-American urban areas in
the 1940s and it caused a dramatic loss of population in central cities. Middle class whites5
migrated to suburban towns surrounding central cities. This trend was strengthened by state
freeway programs that drew more people to the suburbs and affected the character of central
cities substantially. Moreover, the national economy changed significantly in the 1950s and
1960s and contributed to a fundamental change of the urban economy from one dominated by
industry and manufacturing toward a service-oriented economy base. Central cities were
heavily affected as industry and retail markets began moving to the surrounding suburbs. The
retail picture in downtown areas worsened as suburban regional shopping centers thrived. As
a consequence of decreasing population and employment opportunities central cities began
showing threatening signs of decay. The multifaceted out-migration triggered deteriorating
social and economic conditions in central cities and led to a general urban crisis of US-
American cities. Cities became increasingly dependent on grants and aids as fiscal bases
declined. Cities urgently needed to retain and attract businesses and industry and to lure
shoppers back from the suburbs.
The challenges for cities have been substantial and therefore have caused a number of new
problem solving strategies. The problems and challenges have caused “new directions in
urban management” (Clagget, W. E., in: Fosler, 1982:287) that have triggered public-private
cooperative activities. Thus, the restructuring of  the economy constrained public resources
while at the same time encouraging partnerships between the public and private sectors.
Therefore, partnership building can be considered a necessity due to urban economic and
demographic shifts and cutbacks in government funding that hit cities dramatically.
Fiscal distress was unquestionable a substantial factor that have encouraged the surge of
public-private partnerships in the US particularly since the 1970s. As Cummings, Koebel, and
Whitt noticed, “[p]ublic-sector partners do not have the political or financial flexibility to
allow them [private sector partners] to walk away from the negotiation table. If market forces
have driven the downtown into deterioration, local officials do not have access to the money
or the power to finance urban redevelopment by themselves. In order to generate the capital
and political commitment to a major urban development program, the public sector must
forge some type of relationship with private developers, investors, and speculators”
(Cummings; Koebel; Whitt, in: Squires, 1989:216).
Economic decline and the urban crisis also stimulated the formation of public-private
partnerships in urban development in Germany. The  Ruhrgebiet in the State Nordrhein-
Westfalen can be considered an excellent example for the economic-driven theory of public-
private cooperation. The Ruhrgebiet is an old-industrial region that strongly depended on
heavy industries. Due to the deindustrialization beginning in the late 1970s the region has
experienced a dramatic decline. Cities such as Oberhausen, Essen, Bochum, and Duisburg
have suffered in particular since they have increasingly been characterized by brownfields and
derelict buildings even in central city areas.
The public-private partnership model in the US was developed as a policy tool during the
Carter administration. In conjunction with the accelerating urban crisis the Carter
administration, for the first time,  "articulated a national urban policy that encouraged public-
private partnerships and targeted federal aid specifically to improve the economic base of
distressed central cities” (Lyall, K. C., in: Fosler; Berger, 1982:52). Thus, the impetus for
partnerships came significantly from the White House as well as state houses throughout the
country. “Since 1978, public-private partnerships have been increasingly seen as legitimate
and effective tools for achieving a number of public purposes. Virtually every major United
States city has had redevelopment programs mounted, at least in part, through successful and
increasingly sophisticated partnerships” (Lyall, K. C., in: Davis, P., 1986:9). In the late 1970s
all levels of government shared the idea that the heightened urban problems could not be
addressed by government alone but only with the support of the private sector. In fact,
President Carter made public-private cooperation the centerpiece of his national urban policy
in 1978.6
“Focused, coordinated and sustained public investment in distressed urban areas is required to
compensate for the increased risk of private investment in these areas. [...] Federal and State
governments must have at their disposal a full array of incentives to foster business activity in
distressed places [...]” (The President’s Urban and Regional Policy Group Report, 1978:II-9).
Partnerships have appeared to be an appropriate tool to attack social and economic
restructuring problems of cities by "integrating capital, leading sectors and favored social
groups in specific locations” (Newman, P.; Verpraet, G., 1999:488). Public-private
partnerships have been supported by city officials in efforts to attain and institutionalize
involvement of the private sector in cities (Stephenson, M. O., 1991:111).
Encouraging private enterprise to solve public problems was one of the big ideas for
government in the late 1970s and 1980s. City entrepreneurship and public-private
partnerships were part of this tack in public urban policy. (Frieden; Sagalyn, 1989:216). The
Carter Administration aggressively promoted public-private cooperation through its Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. UDAG was launched in 1977 and was
designed to help stimulate economic development in cities in a way that CDBG could not
achieve. The UDAG program served as the basic instrument for the Carter administration for
leveraging private investment for local economic development. In essence, UDAG explicitly
required private sector investment (see II.2.C).
Joint public-private ventures had a boost in the 1980s as public-private partnerships were
fostered by the Reagan Administration. Reagan brought about fundamental changes in urban
policy. His policy rested on three basic pillars: (1) national economic recovery, (2) ‘New
Federalism’ that aimed at devolution , and (3) greater local self-reliance and responsibility
(Ledebur, L. C., 1984:192). The concept of a ‘New Federalism’ of the Reagan administration
transferred responsibilities for urban revitalization to local governments. Local entities had to
come up with new approaches to search for funds and financing methods. Public-private
partnerships met the need for new innovative approaches in urban development with regard to
Reagan’s policy demands.  The differences between ‘new’ partnerships in the 1980s and
previous partnerships in the 1950s until 1970s lay  in the “need for local governments to
innovate in ways that did not involve the federal government and that therefore required a
greater share of private participation” (Lyons, T. S.; Hamlin; R. E., 1991:57). While cities had
to compete increasingly with another, they became more entrepreneurial. Due to Reagan’s
urban policy, so-called entrepreneurial cities emerged  since entrepreneurial strategies have
become more important in municipal politics.
In California an additional factor contributed to public-private cooperation in urban
development. Proposition 13 in 1978 limited property tax increases of municipalities almost
overnight. Accompanied by federal cutbacks, local governments in California had to search
for new ways of revenue raising and financing development. In essence, cities began to raise
additional revenue by becoming active partners in real estate development.
In sum, public-private partnership has been considered a critical catalyst for urban economic
development. The partnership concept were popularized initially by the Carter administration
which announced a ‘new urban policy’, entitled ‘A New Partnership to Conserve America’s
Communities’ in 1978 and then by President Reagan’s ‘New Federalism’ accompanied by
dramatic federal cutbacks in urban programs. Hence, the preceding discussion illustrates a
clear link between the social and economic fragmentation of cities and public-private
partnerships as a form of urban governance.7
B.  Public-Private Partnerships defined
In this chapter I seek to define partnerships in greater detail. The partnership concept suffers
from problems of general application. Thus, one is left with certain basic characteristics of
public-private partnerships such as shared risks and benefits among participants since
partnership definitions are neither conceptually neat nor empirically rigorous. (Haider, D. in:
Davis, P. 1986:139). Moreover, there is no general model of public-private partnership but
rather a range of possible models since each development partnership has to be tailored to
different local circumstances (Bennett; Krebs, 1991:82). The word public-private partnership
has increasingly applied to many initiatives and a wide variety of meanings. As there is no
binding definition, analysts employ the term public-private partnership differently.
Consequently, this may cause misunderstandings and disagreement. For example, though the
federal urban renewal program (1949-1974) is widely considered an early model of public-
private partnerships in urban development in which local governments undertook actions for
land management to develop conditions sufficient to lure private investment into inner cities
(Squires 1989, Levine 1989, CUED 1978, Lyons and Hamlin 1991, Barnekov; Boyle and
Rich 1989), some scientists, however, object to this view. Stephenson doubts  this assumption
since the public sector depended entirely upon the private sector in urban renewal
development projects. He asserts that a partnership “implies a dynamic interactive
collaboration between sectors” (Stephenson, M. O., 1991:111).
With the boost of public-private partnerships in urban development in the 1980s literature
about public-private partnerships increased as well. As a consequence, public-private
partnership has been an “abused” and “overworked” term in the US particularly in the 1980s
(Whelan, R. K, 1989:236). Discussions of urban partnerships are based on different
perceptions. Some scholars (Fosler; Lyall; Davis) consider public-private partnership a broad
political alliance between city hall or the mayor and the business community on the other
hand in order to achieve collaborative efforts to revitalize cities for mutual benefit.
Accordingly, public-private partnerships are regarded as a continuous process, “requiring a
stable network of interpersonal relationships developed over a considerable period of time”
(Lyall, 1982:52). In this regard, public-private partnership is a multisectoral coalition rather
than a development agreement. An example for such an urban coalition is the “Chicago
Central Area Committee” that was founded for the improvement of Chicago’s CBD. But even
the description of partnerships as processes is not homogenous in the literature. Whereas
Lyall refers to working relationships between public officials and mayors with business
associations that have developed, for instance, in committees or through informal structures,
Hamlin and Lyons, however, consider the term process as the “total vehicle for making the
project happen” (Hamlin, R. E.; Lyons, T. S., 1996:172). Here, the word process goes beyond
organizational structures.
But public-private cooperation does not necessarily develop and grow as the term process
assumes. Cooperative arrangements have also been drawn up in response to specific urban
problems in single development projects. Public-private cooperation based on development
agreements or public sector provisions of subsidies and incentives to developer are described
as public-private partnership by some scholars (Krumholz). Even enterprise zones are
considered to be public-private partnerships by proponents of this premise (Collman 1989,
Wolf 1990, Haar 1984) as the public sector offers tax incentives to businesses in special
geographical areas. Accordingly, the term public-private partnership is based on a broad
definition that encompasses a wide variety of partnership activities.
By and large the word public-private partnership embraces three meanings in terms of
institutionalization. First, analysts refer to public-private partnerships when speaking about
informal multi-sector relationships usually in efforts to draw up plans for downtown
revitalization. Second, scholars use the term to describe public-private deals and agreements.8
In that case partnerships are “deal specific” and are only struck for special development
projects.  Finally, public-private partnerships are described as organizations (Ledebur
1984:204). In this way,  partnerships are based on institutional commitments including
downtown development corporations, economic development corporations or committees.
Stephenson notes that  “when institutionalized, public-private partnerships have typically been
project or deal driven” (Stephenson, M. O., 1991:125).
Some authors do not use an exact definition of public-private partnership ahead of their
discussion of public-private cooperation issues. Others define their perceptions of public-
private partnerships more or less precisely and comprehensively from a scientific point of
view. To come up with a definition of public-private partnership, however, it may be helpful
to define partnerships from a law point of view at first and then apply this definition to urban
development. According to Friedman a partnership is:
“An agreement between two or more entities to go into business or invest. Either partner may bind the
other, within the scope of the partnership. Each partner is liable for all the partnership’s debts. [...]”
(Friedman, J. P. 1997:249).
As each partner is liable for the debts, this kind of partnership is called ‘mixed partnership’
(Hamlin; Lyons, 1996:31). Another form of partnership may be a ‘limited partnership’:
“[...] in which there is at least one partner who is passive and limits liability to the amount invested
[limited partner], and at least one partner whose liability extends beyond monetary investment [general
partner]. “(Friedman, J. R. 1997: 149)
A general partner is an entrepreneur and manager, while the limited partner is a passive
investor. A limited partnership must have at least one general partner. Consequently, for a
partnership to exist, two or more partners need to engage in business together and share the
profits. How can this simple concept applied best to development partnerships as a special
form of partnerships?
Public-private partnerships are often defined too narrow as the definitions do not consider
important elements of public-private cooperation. The definition by Leithe and Joseph can be
used as example:
“A pubic/private partnership can be defined as an activity undertaken by government and business to
provide public services that either entity finds impossible or less economical to perform on its own”
(Leithe; J., 1990: 105).
Indeed, it is important to mention that public-private partnerships are a trade-off between the
participants in order to pool resources and certain abilities in a development project that the
partners could not have carried out alone. But Leithe and Joseph speak only about provision
of public services. Therefore they only take various forms of privatization used to finance
local government needs such as contracting out into account. Important components of
partnership activities in urban development such as public subsidies for private projects or co-
development accompanied by negotiated public benefits are not included.
The most cited definition, however, is the one formulated by the Committee for Economic
Development (CED) in their ground-breaking publication ‘Public-private partnerships. An
Opportunity for Urban Communities’:
“Pubic-private partnership means cooperation among individuals and organizations in the public and
private sectors for mutual benefit. Such cooperation has two dimensions: the policy dimension, in
which the goals of the community are articulated, and the operational dimension, in which those goals
are pursued. The purpose of public-private partnership is to link these dimensions in such a way that9
the participants contribute to the benefit of the broader community while promoting their own
individual or organizational interests.” (CED, 1982:2)
In a pioneering study of coordinated economic development in 1978, the National Council on
Urban Economic Development (CUED) defined public-private cooperation in urban
development as follows:
“Collaboration on a joint public/private development project involves the timely sharing of resources
and expertise and the coordination of activities. In essence, it is a negotiated business deal in which
trade-offs are made, and risks, benefits and profits are shared. It is a multi-faceted process structured to
fill gaps in the local investment climate, such as unavailability of capital, problems with land
assemblage, high taxes and potential weak demand for the project. ” (CUED, 1978:197)
Both definitions reflect the aforementioned differences in the understanding of public-private
partnerships. The CED stresses that partnerships are ‘cooperative’ and entail mutuality of
goals and benefits that contribute to the benefit of the broader community. Public-private
partnerships are broadly defined where cooperation  can take several forms including public
incentives to facilitate private activity and joint development ventures. The CUED, however,
views collaborative processes in joint ventures more precisely as shared commitment of
investment, risk, and liability based on a negotiated business deal. Moreover, the CED
considers pubic-private partnership as a too altruistic form of multisectoral cooperation since
partnerships have not served mutual and community goals in a lot US-American cities.
Perhaps the most precise definition of public-private partnerships in urban development is the
one by Hamlin and Lyons:
“Defined broadly, it [public-private partnership] describes an innovative set of activities in which the
public interest and private investment return are mutually pursued by a variety of mixed, collaborative
entities. In reality the partnership is more a process than an organizational structure. [...] Public-private
partnerships often mean governmental involvement to perfect the real estate market by mitigating
urban externalities so as to free the natural process of urban renewal and development. [...] The
concept as defined broadly in the United States includes a spectrum of relationships between
organizations for the establishment and pursuit of mutual goals. It is not limited to normal legal or
financial partnerships.” (Hamlin, R. E.; Lyons, T. S., 1996:168)
The cornerstones of public-private partnerships in urban development summarized from the
different definitions above are the following: (1) pooling resources through joint investments,
risk, and liabilities, (2) negotiations among participants, and (3) cooperation and mutuality
though partnerships have often not shared common or broader community goals.
Partnership is defined in this paper as cooperation between the public and private sectors,
usually based on formal agreements, sometimes informal as well, to work together towards
specific urban development objectives. Public-private partnerships can be understood
analogous to business partnerships with profit and risk sharing, general partners and limited
partners, and different roles and different objectives for those that are responsible for
developing strategies and those responsible for implementing it. The partners may act as equal
participants, however, equality is an ambitious ideal that can rarely realized in practice.
To conclude, the word public-private partnership is often used more broadly than the project-
oriented approach as a loose term for a variety of types of cooperation. There are many forms
of public-private cooperation in urban development ranging from task forces, formal
organizations, corporations and even direct subsidies from public entities to private
corporations or property owners have been described as public-private partnerships.
Partnerships may be long-lasting relationships between the public and private sectors, ad hoc
committees or joint development ventures. In some cases the term public-private partnership
is used so broadly, that only imagination limits its definition and therefore the word10
partnership connotes relationship since the legal definition of partnership is by no means
applicable.
C.  Periods of Public-Private Cooperation in the US
Collaborative approaches have been essential to urban revitalization since the 1950s. Federal
urban programs that foster public-private cooperation in urban development have been the
following: Urban Renewal Program (1949-1974), Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG) as grants to cities for a wide range of development and revitalization uses (since
1974), the terminated Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) which were provided to
cities to support commercial industrial projects, and Section 108 that provides loan guarantees
for cities. All programs were or are still offered by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). Urban renewal is in retrospect strongly associated with downtown
revitalization.
1.  Urban Renewal Partnerships
Initially, urban renewal was conceived as housing program but turned “into a major tool for
subsidizing and assisting private-sector commercial and industrial projects in American
cities” (Eisinger, 1988:93). A key aspect of postwar urban renewal was the use of public
resources to support redevelopment of CBDs. The private sector was subsidized by urban
renewal in form of write-downs of land sold or leased to developers. Through HUD
Washington offered grants to city governments to meet the cost of public subsidies in support
of renewal processes. As a result, federal resources were essential to early public-private
partnerships in urban development. The local urban renewal authority might use eminent
domain to purchase a site. It then contracted to have the site physically cleared and prepared
for the sale to a potential developer. Usually the price was considerably lower than the
developer would have to pay in the private market. The difference between the costs for
purchasing and clearing the site for the redevelopment agency and the received sales price for
the site is called ‘write-down’. Furthermore, local governments fostered economic
development by providing infrastructure and granting tax benefits to developers. The private
developers or investors in return promised the purchase of particular land parcels and to built
for example a hotel. General obligation bonds were the most used long-term debt by
municipalities in order to finance redevelopment projects.
In short, urban renewal provided lucrative opportunities for private developers and investors
since developers were provided with public subsidies. The program aimed at public-private
cooperation as it was designed to offer substantial incentives to private developers to build
within the project areas. Kleinberg concluded that urban renewal was “an intergovernmentally
decentralized program federally subsidized to support redevelopment”, while it was also “an
intersectoral program connecting public and private sectors in a government-business
partnership for redevelopment.”  (Kleinberg, B., 1995:143) Thus, urban renewal depended
highly upon close cooperation with private developers and investors. Urban renewal focused
considerably on economic goals and therefore can be described as business-oriented approach
to urban revitalization at the expense of social achievements. Additionally, an innovative
institutional approach was launched since local renewal agencies were separated form public
housing agencies in most cities following the viewpoint that urban renewal should have its
first priority on economic revitalization and the reconstruction of downtown and its CBD11
(Kleinber, B., 1995:145). Moreover, nonprofit development corporations were established
such as the Charles Center/Inner Harbor Management Corporation in Baltimore in 1965.
Urban renewal partnerships are described as ‘arm’s length partnerships’ between the public
and private sectors. Due to the fact that “[f]ederal rules for urban renewal directed a sharp
separation between city renewal agencies and developers. The city was responsible for
planning a project and carrying it forward until the land was cleared and ready for new
construction. [...] Developers had no role at all during the advance planning” (Frieden;
Sagalyn, 1989:43). Cites had to make plans for cleared sites, but often they were unable to
find developers to buy the land and carrying out the development project. Thus, developers
were excluded from the planning process. Their job was to take over projects perceived by
city staffers and to get them built. The poor public-private sector cooperation during planning
processes led to significant negative impacts on urban structures. This was the case for
instance in Saint Paul when in the late 1960s and early 1970s several blocks were cleared.
City staff prepared comprehensive plans for this area, but eventually no development proposal
could meet the desired density and mixture of uses while still meet financial feasibility. As a
result of this planning mistake, the cleared blocks stayed vacant in the 1970s and the area
became known as the “superhole”. (Brandl, J.; Brook, R., 1982:189). This example illustrate
the insufficient arm’s length multisectoral partnerships that excluded the project planning
process.
Urban renewal partnerships as early examples of intersectoral partnerships in urban
development focused on massive, visible brick-and-mortar development projects in
downtown that “showpieced public-private experiments in central-city revitalization” (Haider,
D., 1986:139). The clear spatial priority of public-private partnerships on downtown and its
CBD as well as the fact that redevelopment was exclusively physical is due to the chief role of
business executives in redevelopment. Downtown coalitions had built strong alliances to
rebuilt downtown and capture federal funds. The thrust of public-private partnerships is the
so-called ‘downtown-corporate strategy’ that means shaping downtown areas into centers of
corporate headquarters with banking, professional support services, office buildings, and
hotels.
To conclude, this kind of partnership had four main characteristics (Levine, 1989:19-21):
•  Public-private partnerships were governed by local corporate committees such as
ACCD (Allegheny Conference on Community Development), GBC (Great Baltimore
Council) whose chief goal was to revitalize CBDs;
•  Public-private partnerships were stimulated by federal monies through the Urban
Renewal program. This approach- using public dollars to ‘leverage’ private
investment- became a cardinal principle of public-private partnerships;
•  Autonomous redevelopment agencies emerged as new instruments of urban
governance. Public financial and land use powers including eminent domain and
resource allocation were used by those entities. In some cities even private
development corporations were established;
•  Public entrepreneurship with profound support of the mayor (entrepreneurial mayors).
Cities underwent urban renewal particularly in the 1960’s and 1970’s until the program’s
termination in 1974 through consolidation into CDBG. CDBG is a legacy of the Nixon
administration though it was signed into law by then-president Ford. CDBG consolidated
seven former programs, the most important of which were Urban Renewal and Model Cities.
By and large urban renewal partnerships were extremely project-oriented given the business
community a special role. The public and private sectors had separate roles. Therefore,
partnerships in that time are considered as arm’s length partnerships. “The urban renewal
program depended upon a complex intermixture of private initiative and public authority”12
(Barnekov, T.; Boyle, R.; Rich, D., 1989:39) Urban Renewal was a new instrument that
combined the powers of the public sector with the development resources of the private
sector. The success of urban renewal depended upon the partnership between the public and
private sectors. The model for business initiative in urban renewal was the Allegheny
Conference in Pittsburgh. Urban redevelopment partnerships with a combination of private
influence and public resources to rebuild the downtown area became a common model for
US-American cities (Barnekov, T.; Boyle, R.; Rich, D., 1989:42).
2.  Post-Urban Renewal Partnerships
Post-urban renewal partnerships increased sharply at the end of the 1970s and 1980s. In
contrast to urban renewal partnerships the scope of public-private partnerships became
broader and more expansive (Lyall, K. C., 1986:9). Public-private partnerships have been
launched as policy tool by the Carter administration in its  National Urban Policy in 1978
(Lyall, K. D., 1986:12). The boost of public-private partnerships in urban development at that
time, however, is due to cutbacks in federal monies especially since the Reagan
administration. As a consequence, multisectoral commercial development projects became
more important due to shrinking public budgets and the search for new public revenue
sources. Joint public-private ventures were fostered explicitly by the Reagan Administration.
“In the context of heightened intercity competition for private investment, municipal
governments became entrepreneurial, providing an extensive web of subsidies and incentives
to developers, and often becoming co-developers of risky redevelopment projects” (Levine,
M. V., 1989:12).
Historically, local governments fostered economic development by providing infrastructure
and granting tax benefits. However, a fundamental change in this pattern took place.
Partnerships of public and private entities have undertaken investments for mutual benefit,
and semipublic corporations have acted as initiators and implementers of development
projects.  Lyall states that there have been noticeable changes in the structure of public-private
partnerships (Lyall, K. C., 1982:52-53). She argued that the concept of public-private
partnerships has become more “sophisticated” and the projects themselves have become
“more complex financially and managerially and require more flexibility”. Those kind of
partnerships have involved more than an exchange of resources and privileges. Cities even
share the costs and risks in joint development projects. Levine similarly argues that public-
private partnerships “differed from the earlier versions mainly in the expanded scope and
complexity of their activity, and in the increased public resources and power that were made
available to support private development (Levine, M. V., 1989:22).”
Cooperative planning and action extended the arm’s length urban renewal partnerships. “The
arm’s length transaction is pretty much a thing of the past; we are now creating joint ventures
of immense complexity utilizing the assets of both the public and private sectors to make
something happen which neither could do alone” (Millspaugh, M. cited by Lyall, K. C.,
1982:53).
A growing number of municipalities have become active partners in real estate development
since the 1980s. Cities “seek to cash in on their real estate assets, just as private corporations
do. Many become equity partners in real estate ventures- or, by issuing infrastructure bonds,
become ‘silent’ partners” (Fulton, 1987:6). Cities seek to generate profits. By doing so,
however, cities risk controversy and litigation. Local government borrowing for financing
private nonprofit and profit facilities through revenue bonds rose sharply in the 1970s. Thus,
cities have avoided voter approval because this kind of bonds are not guaranteed by the13
issuing government because anticipated future revenues from the facility are used to pay back
the bonds.  One can conceive a growing injection of private funds into public activities
including financing of public infrastructure and flows of public money into private ventures
on the other hand (Collmann, 1989:5). Moreover, the acquiring of equity positions in private
projects serving no public purpose has being taken by many localities. Collmann speaks about
the growing  commingling of private and public funds (Collmann 1989:145).
Due to the active involvement of cities in the real estate market, cities duties of
comprehensive planning weakens in favor of deal making and compromises with developers
and investors. City planning and real estate market have become more intertwined (Fulton,
1987:7).  Fulton describes this tack as a “ sophisticated version of urban renewal” since
instead of “subsidizing developers to persuade them to build, as they did in the 1960s and
1970s, cities are demanding a piece of the action for their entrepreneurial efforts (Fulton,
1987:7).” A shortcoming occurs when deal-making and revenue raising are favored and
planners become real estate agents at the expense of sound land-use planning.
One of the fundamental objectives of the public/private marriage may be to spread the risk
and costs of development among a larger number of participants. Shared benefits are to add as
the public sector has embarked on negotiations for public benefits (compare: Sagalyn, 1997).
Another important component of post-urban renewal partnership is its formalization.
Partnerships have achieved formality through contractual agreements, including public
documentation of partnership agreements and specification of the expectations and
responsibilities of each partner.
To conclude, post-urban renewal partnerships are characterized by: (1) sharing development
risk and financial obligation, (2) creative financing techniques with an array of subsidies,
loans, loan guarantees and so forth ass well as complex arrangements of public and private
financing, (3) equity involvement of the public sector in joint development projects, (4)
increased reliance of cities on tax incentives to stimulate private investment, (5) municipal
borrowing through tax-exempt bonds, and (6) entrepreneurial development with private
mavericks and public entrepreneurs. Partnerships for commercial redevelopment, so-called
economic-development partnerships, have dominated like in urban renewal partnerships with
the intention to generate taxes. That trend can best be illustrated by high-rise office
complexes, hotels, and convention centers which have increasingly being built since the
1980s. Instead of employing exclusively federal aid to solve urban problems, solutions now
were sought in partnerships with the private sector that were suited to make the best use of
shrinking funds from state and federal governments. The comparison between earlier
approaches of public-private partnerships in the 1950s and 1960s with the new era of public-
private partnerships beginning in the late 1970s and 1980s has shown that public-private
partnerships have strongly increased and on the other hand have changed significantly in
qualitative terms.
a)  Redevelopment and Tax-Increment Financing
Redevelopment has been popular among cities nationwide since the late 1970s since it is a
tool designed to facilitate real estate investment in targeted areas. The roots of redevelopment
clearly lie in the federal urban renewal program (see chapter II.C.1). As redevelopment differs
from state to state, I will focus my analysis on California since my case studies in the
following third chapter are in California as well.
Redevelopment in California is based on the California Community Redevelopment Act,
which was enacted in 1945 and renamed the Community Redevelopment Law (Health and
Safety Code, § 3300 et seq.) in 1951. Most importantly, tax increment financing (TIF) was14
introduced with the Community Redevelopment Law. This new financing technique allows
redevelopment agencies to “receive and spend property tax revenues from the increase in
assessed value that has occurred after adopting a redevelopment project” (Beatty, D. F. et al.,
1995:5). After the wipeout of the federal urban renewal program TIF became very important
in other states as well. TIF can be considered a reaction of local governments to federal
government departure in urban issues.
TIF have become increasingly attractive to municipalities since local governments can finance
land management and public improvement with TIF bonds backed by future tax increments.
Moreover, the issuance of TIF bonds don’t require voter approval and subsidies can be
targeted to special TIF districts (TIFS). That explains, why TIF has become one of the leading
downtown strategies. In this connection, redevelopment and TIF depend highly on the success
of the private sector.  TIF is so popular since municipalities use it without raising taxes. In
California it allows the floating of revenue bonds and avoid restrictions on general obligation
bonds imposed by Proposition 13. San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego have used TIF
particularly in downtown.
As the addition of Article XIII.A to the California Constitution in 1978, called the Proposition
13, considerably reduced property tax revenue of local governments and redevelopment
agencies in California as well as eliminated general obligation bonds, TIF became the
principle source of financing of redevelopment projects. According to Eisinger, California is
the state in which TIF is most widely spread (Eisinger, P. K., 1988:185). The decrease in
property tax revenue led cities to compete for development that generate high sales taxes such
as auto malls, shopping malls, and ‘big box’ retail developments. Whereas redevelopment
used to be an urban development tool of large cities, it has spread to medium-sized and small
cities as a result of decreasing property tax revenues.
The Community Redevelopment Act and later the Community Redevelopment Law give
every city and council in California the authority to establish redevelopment agencies.
Redevelopment agencies are unique among public agencies since in order to achieve goals of
revitalization they must rely upon cooperation with the private sector. Therefore, virtually
everything what redevelopment agencies have done is a partnership with the private sector.
The following tools give redevelopment agencies essential power to influence urban
development (Beatty, D. F. et al., 1995:1-2):
•  The authority to buy real property including, if necessary, the power to use eminent
domain (traditionally, eminent domain could be used only for public purposes);
•  The authority to develop property (but not to construct buildings);
•  The authority to sell real property without bidding;
•  The authority and obligation to relocate persons who have interests in property
acquired by the agency;
•  The authority to finance their operations by borrowing from federal or state
governments and selling bonds;
•  The authority to impose land use and development controls pursuant to a
comprehensive plan of redevelopment.
There are three options regarding the organization of redevelopment agencies: First, the city
government may establish itself as the governing board of the redevelopment agency. Second,
the city government may establish a separate governing board of the redevelopment agency.
Or third, the city government may establish a community development commission (Beatty,
D. F. et al., 1995:15). The vast majority of cities in California has appointed the city council
as governing body of the redevelopment agency. But an redevelopment agency is always a
separate legal entity from the city. That means, that there is a clear legal distinction between
the city council and its redevelopment agency (Beatty, D. F. et al., 1995:19).15
Fulton stresses that there “is simply no other planning tool in California that gives local
governments such sweeping power [...]” (Fulton, W., 1999:246).
To conclude, since federal urban programs have dropped remarkable and Proposition 13 in
California further diminished the ability of local governments to pay for needed infrastructure,
cities have few alternatives to redevelopment activities.
TIF has been used as financial tool for infrastructure improvements especially in downtown
by cities of all sizes. Common redevelopment projects have been: (1) the improvement or
expansion of an existing shopping center through, for instance, redesigning and reconstructing
a nearby freeway interchange and improving access, (2) the improvement of CBDs in
cooperation with downtown business owners, and (3) encouraging more nighttime uses in
downtown and provide parking for daytime shoppers. As we have seen, redevelopment
provide an essential framework for public-private partnerships in the US. In this connection
TIF is an important financial tool that have backed public-private development financing.  A
TIF redevelopment project has to pay for itself. Through the issuance of tax increment bonds
local governments have provided ‘up-front’ financing. Since TIF and the financing of
redevelopment projects depend on private sector investment, plans and agreements are, in
contrast to urban renewal, in accordance with the need of the business community.
b)  Institutional Innovation Partnerships have brought about
Discussing redevelopment including TIF in the preceding section I already mentioned
redevelopment agencies as institutional innovation in the 1950s and important instrument for
public-private cooperation in urban development. Another essential tack toward public-
private partnership building in urban development in the US was the establishment of quasi-
public and quasi-private organizations.
Public-private development institutions were new launched in urban redevelopment in the late
1970s for carrying out development projects. They have been formed to join the public and
the private sectors as well as to pool resources more efficiently. The combination of both
public and private representatives on the same task force or corporation “represents a major
shift from traditional public/private relationships” (CUED, 1978:165). The development and
use of a new kind of  public-private development institution have unquestionable been
contributed to joint public-private development projects. Public-private institutions reflect the
institutionalizing process of public-private partnerships. The establishment of formal
institutions have occurred at both the planning and implementation levels (CUED, 1978:166).
Joint planning institutions include committees to set up new development policies. Joint
institutions with implementation capacities are quasi-public corporations or private
development authorities.
 “These organizations can be either quasi-public corporations that exercise public powers and
authority to use special financial tools provided through federal, state, and local governments
or independent, usually nonprofit corporations established under general nonprofit
corporation law serving public purposes with boards made up of public- and private-sector
representatives” (CED, 1982:43). Development Corporations provide a specialized service to
the city on a contractual basis in contrast to city agencies which serve a permanent function
(Lyall, 1982:40).
Quasi-public corporations, nonprofit development corporations, and economic development
corporations are organizations with delegated powers and responsibilities from both sectors
that has been growing since the 1980’s (compare: Lyall, K. C., 1986:12). In quasi-public
entities public-private negotiating has taken place, actually beyond conventional public
entities. This corporations had and still have extraordinary powers traditionally reserved for16
public entities such as land assemblage and condemnation, bond issuance, administration of
grants and loans, and provision of investment inducements such as tax abatements. The
advantages of quasi-public corporations are the following: First, they have professional staff.
Second, they are the semi-independent development arm of the city (Barbour, G. P.,
1982:229) with an separate budget. Third, they can contract for construction without
competitive bidding (Lyall, 1982:50). Forth, they are more flexible than city agencies since
they act relatively independent of local government supervision. Fifth, powers of quasi-public
development institutions such as downtown development authorities include eminent domain,
selling tax-exempt revenue bonds, ability to receive revenue from the sale or lease of property
(compare: CED, 1978:168).
Examples for quasi-public corporations are the ‘Center City Development Corporation’
(CCDC), a nonprofit development corporation in San Diego, and  the ‘Economic
Development Corporation of San Diego County’ (EDC).
Advantages of private development corporations are the following: First, they are independent
from the local government. Second, they are not constrained by certain restrictions imposed
on local governments. Third, they have powers that are not allowable for public entities such
as real estate acquisition, equity investments and loans. Forth, they are financial independent
of the city budget. Last, they have professional expertise.
In addition to establishing new development institutions, public-private partnerships have
contributed to the reorganization of existing departments and agencies. For instance, the
“Department of Planning and Economic Development (PED) was created [in Saint Paul] to
consolidate four separate agencies. Under the direction of the mayor and city council, PED
could respond as one agency to such developer’s needs as zoning, financing, project
coordination, and management” (Brandl, J.; Brook; R., 1982:184).
To sum up, development corporations were formed explicitly for facilitating public and
private sectors cooperation. Quasi-public, nonprofit development corporations are run like
private corporations but empowered to receive and spend public and private money. They
have special authorized powers such as eminent domain and issuance of tax-exempt revenue
bonds. As a consequence, it has become less clear over time what is public and what is private
due to separate development entities. Development corporations were increasingly used by
local governments since the 1970s and each has had its own combination of public and private
participants and funding arrangements. Due to the powers of development corporations in
contrast to public entities, the city through the development corporation could act as an
investor and risk taker in partnership with the private sector.
c)  UDAG Program and Public-Private Cooperation
UDAG was launched in 1977 and was designed to help stimulate economic development in
cities in a way that CDBG could not achieve. Like urban renewal, the focus of UDAG was on
physical redevelopment as a means to local economic development. But their were significant
differences that generated UDAG partnerships in urban development. This section describes
the UDAG program and its contribution to public-private partnerships in greater detail
The UDAG program served as the basic instrument of the Carter administration for leveraging
private investment for local economic development. In essence, UDAG explicitly required
private sector investment. As Eisinger states, the “insistence on a prior guarantee of private
sector investment distinguishes UDAG from all previous federal economic development
programs” (Eisinger, 1988:114). “HUD regulations set a minimum leveraging ratio of  2.5
private dollars to every 1 UDAG dollar” (Eisinger, 1988:120). Moreover, UDAG, in contrast
to Urban Renewal, required prior commitment of developers before any project. The program17
permitted entrepreneurial local governments to share risks with the private sector in order to
leverage private investment. UDAG were largely used for repayable loans by municipalities.
Cities also used UDAG to take an equity position in private sector projects in return for
UDAG assistance. More specifically, loans were heavily subsidized through UDAG and in
return cities demanded profit-sharing in the development project. In some cities UDAG was
the “key financial mechanism” in  redevelopment. Most cities provided financial incentives to
developers and investors through UDAG (Keating; Krumholz; Metzger, 1989:129). UDAG
gave cities considerable discretion how they spent their grants. A city might use it for a
variety of incentives for private development activities, including (low-interest) loans, land
write-downs, land assemblage, provision of public infrastructure and so forth. But each
UDAG project required “a minimum of at least two participants (one public, one private)”
(Clarke; Rich, 1982:53).
A distinct feature of the UDAG program was its shift from a mere grant program to “an
investment program in which government agencies loan their action grant funds to private or
nonprofit participants, enabling the public sector to recapture its UDAG funds and recycle
them for future housing and community development activities (Clarke; Rich, 1982:54)”. Due
to this new public action, Clarke and Rich characterize those cities as “entrepreneurial” in
contrast to “donor” cities (Clarke; Rich, 1982:54). The major mechanism through which cities
generate an income out of UDAG funds are lease agreements, loans, and equity participation.
Cities might either lease land or facilities. Cities might use their UDAG funds also as loans to
the private sector. Clarke and Rich state that in 1980 about one-third of UDAG funds were
used as loans. The most noteworthy instrument, however, is equity participation. Here cities
contracted “kicker” provisions in development agreements which permit the city or the
authorized agency to share in the net cash flow of the development project (Clarke; Rich,
1982:55).
In conclusion, the Reagan administration launched the UDAG program explicitly to facilitate
and encourage development partnerships. Fostering public-private partnerships in urban
development was due to the assumption, that the public sector alone could not revitalize
decaying cities. The UDAG program “demanded that entrepreneurs sign a statement that
stipulated that ‘but for’ the federal grant, they would have been unable to proceed with the
project” (Stephenson, M. O., 1991:115). The stated purpose of the UDAG program was to
“fill financing gaps in public-private economic development projects” (Frieden; Sagalyn,
1989:160). UDAG were explicitly designed to leverage private resources. Development firms
had to agree to invest a specific amount of money in the project by entering a legally binding
commitment. In return they could receive a direct cash subsidy from the federal government.
With UDAG cities were able to experiment with new financial techniques. Cities have
changed their financial assistance from grants to loans and in doing so accumulating loan
paybacks. “As a development tool, the UDAG program was both more flexible and more
precise than urban renewal” (Barnekov, T.; Boyle, R.; Rich, D., 1989:74).
III.  Typology of Public-Private Partnerships
There have been some attempts to classify public-private partnerships. The classifications are
surprisingly different from each other and more or less comprehensive. Some scientists focus
only on a certain city and describe local public-private partnership while a general application
is missing. Some analysts, in contrast, classify public-private partnerships concerning only
certain partnership element while forget about other important partnership characteristics.
Some scholars use special terms in order to distinguish partnerships but do not take the wide18
variety of public-private partnerships into account. In fact, there is no accepted typology of
public-private partnerships and some scholars even argue that there is no typology at all. This
section seeks to represent some classifications of public-private partnerships conceived by
different scholars. Subsequently, I propose a typology that is based on three pillars: (1) the
organizational structure of partnerships in terms of formal agreements, (2) the involvement of
the public sector regarding financing of specific partnership projects and provision of
financial or not primarily financial incentives in order to attract private investment, and (3)
chief objectives cooperative efforts are aimed at including partnerships spatial foci.
My discussion of a sensible typology of public-private partnerships begins with a review of
some classification of public-private partnerships by different scholars. Stewman and Tarr
distinguish between four types of public-private partnerships in Pittsburgh: (1) environmental,
(2) organizational (both social and managerial), and (3) bricks-and-mortar (Stewman; Tarr,
1982:103). Environmental partnerships for smoke and flood control were the earliest
partnerships in urban development in Pittsburgh. They are considered a prerequisite for CDB
and bricks-and-mortar development. Consequently, environmental partnerships are the bases
for bricks-and-mortar or physical development partnerships in Pittsburgh. But this is true only
for frostbelt cities which were dominated by heavy industries. Stewman and Tarr distinguish
organizational partnerships in social-oriented and managerial-oriented partnerships, whereas
the most novel is the development of social partnerships (Stewman; Tarr, 1982:103). Social
partnerships usually are focused on neighborhood revitalization and  private foundations are
traditionally involved in those kinds of partnerships. Social partnership means broader
participation of the community and in Pittsburgh particularly the black community.
Managerial partnerships try to make government operations more efficient for instance
through the use of private-sector-loaned executives within government.
Figure 1 provides summary information about the different kinds of partnerships in Pittsburgh
including basic objectives and participants.
Figure 1: Public-private partnerships taking Pittsburgh as example





























Source: (own draft) Stewman, S.; Tarr, J. A., 1982:79-11019
As can be seen above, this classification is not appropriate for general application since it is
tailored for public-private partnerships in frostbelt cities. In addition, the classification by
Stewman and Tarr is insufficient for urban development partnerships. In this regard, physical
or bricks-and-mortar partnerships are particularly relevant. Stewman and Tarr do not provide
a more detailed differentiation of bricks-and-mortar partnerships. But as we have seen in
preceding sections of this chapter, there are different periods of public-private partnership
building in the US. Consequently, there do exist different physical development partnerships.
Eisinger, in contrast, provide a more detailed distinction of development partnerships. He
distinguishes  between the following three types of partnerships: (1) indirect partnerships, (2)
more focused partnerships cemented by grants and subsidies, where government plays the role
of subordinate or junior partner, and (3) joint ventures, where government shares risks and
even equity interests (Eisinger, 1988:23). This classification is by far more relevant for a
consideration of urban development partnerships as the one by Stewman and Tarr. As
Eisinger considers only partnerships between local governments and enterprises for economic
development I apply the distinction of partnerships to urban development with some
restrictions.  State enterprise zones and public rehabilitation loans and grant programs may be
considered as indirect partnerships; a more focused or formalized partnerships may be
Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) and the federal empowerment zone program (EZ/EC);
and joint ventures in urban development are joint development projects or development
corporations where the local government may have an equity position.  Although local and
state governments provide tax incentives, loans and grants to the private sector through the
enterprise and rehabilitation programs I tend to consider those relationships as indirect
partnerships instead of more focused one since partnership building is not explicitly expressed
in the programs. In this regard, Eisinger’s typology of public-private partnerships is only
partly applicable to urban development. The federal EZ/EC program, however, differs from
state enterprise zones. The empowerment program is the most recent urban revitalization
program of the federal government. Public-private partnerships and joint development
projects are basic components of the program. While enterprise zones  are “geographical
target tax incentives”,  the EZ/EC program combines “federal tax incentives with direct
funding for physical improvements and social services”. Moreover, the program aims at
private sector investment and “participation by community organizations and residents” on
the other hand (President Clinton’s National Urban Policy Report 1997:45). Therefore, the
program fits into the second category of more formalized partnerships as partnerships are
explicitly demanded and supported by the government. The third kind of partnership, joint
development projects, are by and large a focal point of development partnerships. All
together, this typology is very useful for further consideration.
Squires made two different distinctions of public-private partnerships. First, he entitled his
book concerning partnerships Unequal Partnerships and argues in its introduction that:
“what has frequently been overlooked is the inherently unequal nature of most partnerships.
Frequently they exclude altogether the neighborhood residents most affected by development
decisions [...]. Public goals often go unmet and democratic processes are undermined [...]. The
principal beneficiaries are often large corporations, developers, and institutions” (Squires, 1989:3).
The distinction between equal and unequal partnerships is an often used dichotomy taking the
equality or better the inequality of public and private partners as deciding factor of
differentiation. A similar term is for instance employed by Krumholz. He describes
downtown-focused public-private partnerships as unbalanced partnerships (Krumholz,
Rebuilding America’s Cities, 1982:178). Squires also concerns public-private partnerships in
conjunction with an ideology of privatism with the supreme private sector and the public
sector as junior partner. (Squires, 1991:197). He distinguishes two types of partnerships with20
regard to economic circumstances. Public-private partnerships emerged in the prosperous
postwar era in the 1950s and 1960s.  In contrast, a boost of public-private partnerships
occurred in the 1980s in a situation of economic downturn. Squires entitles those partnerships
as ‘partnerships in an age of decline’ (Squires, 1991:206). In this era “local partnerships have
nurtured downtown development to service the growing service economy” (Squires,
1991:208-9). Similarly, Levine defines three significant periods of public-private
partnerships: (1) the emergence of formal public-private partnerships 1945-1970, (2) the
proliferation of public-private partnerships 1970-1985, and (3) new directions in public-
private partnerships. He assigns features to each period (Levine 1989:19-31). The first and
second partnership approaches of Levine’s categorization are traditional public-private
partnerships as discussed in greater detail in chapter II.C.1 and 2. Novel is the third category
of urban partnerships which have emerged since the 1980s. This new conception of
partnerships is similar to Stewman’s and Tarr’s social partnerships. Neighborhood
revitalization as well as more democratic development processes with greater public control
and more equitable distributions of benefits for instance through linkage policies are the most
important issues of those partnerships (Levine, 1989:29-30). Although Squires’ and Levine’s
time-determined partnership concepts are useful for a description of the evolution of
partnerships and their changes over time, they are, however, insufficient for a comprehensive
classification of public-private partnerships in urban development since both are too
imprecise. Supplemented with other dimensions of partnerships, however, these approaches
may provide a helpful base for a  sound classification of public-private partnerships.
Clarke and Rich develop a typology of public-private partnerships concerning the assumption
of direct responsibility of local governments for carrying out urban program functions and
participating in partnerships (Clarke, S. E.; Rich, M. J., 1982:53). The distinction between
City/ Private, Public/ Private, Nonprofit/ Private, City/ Nonprofit/ Private, and Public/ Private/
Nonprofit  partnerships appears to be appropriate and comprehensively, but Clarke and Rich
examine only partnerships generated by the UDAG program, so-called action grant
partnerships. Because the UDAG program belongs to history and chief urban circumstances
have changed since then the distinction needs to be updated.
A decent classification of public-private partnerships is the one by Hamlin and Lyons
(Hamlin, R. E.; Lyons, T. S., 1996:29-76). They classify public-private partnerships
concerning the major organizational structures and partnership activities. With regard to
partnership organizations they basically make a distinction between:
•  Mixed partnerships,
•  Limited partnerships,
•  Condominiums,
•  Government Authorities, and
•  Private Corporations.
Hamlin and Lyons provide a useful overview of possible public-private organizations in the
US by comprehensively delineating various forms. They highlight possible legal
organizational arrangements and partnership enabling laws. Thus, the approach is
considerable different from the one by Squires, Levine, and Stewman and Tarr. While Squires
and Levine take social consequences of public-private partnerships into account, Hamlin and
Lyons classify public-private partnerships from a law point of view. Therefore, the results are
clearly different from each other. Relevant categories of intersectoral partnership activities
classified by Hamlin and Lyons are the following:





•  Tax Incentives,
•  Markets, and
•  Research.
The partnership activities can be classified basically into financial (finance and tax incentives)
and not primarily financial (land, research, management) activities. Derived from this
categorization, a chief concern of public-private partnerships in the US is finance. Such an
analysis of possible partnership activities is an useful approach to distinguish different kinds
of partnerships. Therefore, Hamlin and Lyons give an excellent overview of various
intersectoral partnership activities that can be employed for further consideration. Perhaps the
most useful and comprehensive typology, however, is the one by Kleinberg (Kleinberg,
1995:253-267). He distinguishes four models of public-private partnership presented in figure
2.
Figure 2: Four models of public-private partnerships by Kleinberg
Unequal (Business-dominated or Corporatist) Partnership
•  Associated with downtown corporate center strategy
•  Private  partners receive most of the benefits
•  Subtypes:
conventional unequal public-private partnership model of the 1950s (Urban Renewal)
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Linked Development Partnership
•  public partner shares more fully in the benefits (less unequal)
Strategic Progressive Planning Model
•  Opposite to business-dominated public-private partnerships
•  New, more people-oriented approach to planning
•  Fosters neighborhood planning and broad public-private partnerships involving
Community Development Communities (CDCs)
Source: (own draft) Kleinberg, 1995, 253-267
Kleinberg presents the unequal partnership and the strategic progressive planning model as
two extreme models of partnerships with two types of linked partnerships in between. Similar
to Squires and Levine, he primarily concerns partnerships in equality terms. Furthermore, he
includes in its classification a logically evolution of partnerships beginning with unequal
partnerships of the 1950s and 1960s and linked partnerships in the 1970s and 1980s. The
strategic progressive planning model, however, is still a vision of urban planning. He
describes the four basic types  of partnerships comprehensively including certain forms the
models may take as well as specific characteristics that distinguish the models from each
other. In this regard he also takes important components of public-private partnerships such as
public sector involvement and spatial elements into account.
In sum, the discussed classifications are very different in nature. Squires, Levine, Stewman,
and Tarr consider distinct types of partnerships from a social point of view, while Hamlin,
Lyons, and Eisinger argue from a law and economic point of view. For a useful typology,
however, it is necessary to take different approaches of classifying public-private partnerships
Limited Linkage Partnership
•  Revenue sharing (trade-off)
•  Spending revenue for example to cut
tax rates for residents or provide social
services
•  Public sector role of an public
entrepreneur (equity partner)
•  Avoiding risk through negotiating
•  Only two partners
•  Spatial focus on CBD
Expanded Linkage Partnership
•  Attempt to distribute purposively the
benefits of redevelopment more widely
beyond downtown including
deteriorated neighborhoods and poor
residents
•  Relatively new type (Boston, San
Francisco in the 1980s)
•  Linkage programs such as fees for
developer23
into account. As I concern public-private partnerships from a geographic point of view, I
intent to stress spatial aspects of public-private cooperation in urban development more than
in the classifications above. Furthermore a sensible typology of public-private partnerships in
urban development should consider the involvement of the public sector regarding financing
of specific partnership projects and the provision of financial or not primarily financial
incentives in order to attract private investment as well as organizational structures and
institutionalization of partnerships. Though Hamlin and Lyons present a comprehensive
overview of possible organizational structures public-private partnerships may take, they do
not consider less institutionalized public-private partnerships that are not based on ‘hard’ law
and formal arrangements. In this regard, Eisinger provides a better solution when speaking
about indirect partnerships including ‘soft’ arrangements between the public and private
sectors. Therefore, it is useful to combine both approaches in order to cover a wide spectrum
of possible organizational structures of public-private partnerships. The distinction between
informal partnerships and formalized partnerships may be an appropriate approach. The
involvement of the public sector may stretch from a low to a high level. It can be expected
that a highly formalized and institutionalized partnership reaches a higher level of public
sector involvement than an informal and low institutionalized public-private partnerships.
Additionally,  the social-determined classification of Squires, Levine, Stewman and Tarr
include preferred objectives and spatial foci of certain public-private partnerships which may
correlate with the degree of public sector involvement and the institutionalization of
partnerships.
A.  Informal Partnerships
Informal relationships between the public and private sectors have a long tradition in the US
including private-sector advice to local governments and planning by the private sector.
Stewman and Tarr describe how the public and private sectors have worked together in
planning matters in Pittsburgh (Stewman, S.; Tarr, J. A., 1982:59-113). The most outstanding
example is the Allegheny Conference on Community Development (ACCD) as critical private
sector organization and “key planning and action organization” (Stewman, S.; Tarr, J. A.,
1982:63). The ACCD had sponsored planning and research in Pittsburgh’s downtown
redevelopment. The Allegheny Conference paid experts to draw plans for redevelopment,
which the public sector then reacted to, usually indicating its acceptance (Sbragia, A.,
1989:107). Building upon the model of the Allegheny Conference, businessmen’s
development committees organized in virtually every major city in the United States between
1945 and 1965.
Cafferty and McCready illustrate the way in which planning for economic development took
place in Chicago in the 1970s (Cafferty, P. S. J.; McCready, W. C., 1982:131-140). Different
sets of actors from both the public and private sectors were involved in the planning process
for downtown. An important group was the “Chicago Central Area Committee” composed of
CEOs of major Chicago corporations. Chief concerns were, for instance, commercial
development, planning and physical improvement. As a result of a comprehensive research
and discussion process, a Chicago central-area plan was conceived and was then discussed
with city staffers. Another important plan was the Chicago 21 plan for the development of the
CBD. To draw up this plan, the Chicago Central Area Committee contracted with an
architectural firm. The Chicago 21 plan strongly influenced redevelopment in downtown
Chicago.
Another example occurred in Minneapolis as the Downtown Council, an organization made
up of corporations to strengthen the downtown area, worked closely together with city24
planners. Concepts for revitalizing downtown were discussed together. (Brandl, J.; Brook; R.,
1982:178). In Minneapolis the Downtown Council provided financial and planning assistance
when the city was considering policies that would affect downtown. The city’s “Plan for the
1980’s” was drawn up in this fashion. In this way, research and studies were often financed
jointly by the city and the council (Brandl, J.; Brook; R.,1982:196).
The Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) is an often cited example of an elite group that
affected downtown planning. CEOs of the largest corporations in the Baltimore metropolitan
area were organized in the GBC. The chief purposes of this group were sound planning and
the implementation of plans in order to foster economic development in the city.  The GBC
and the Committee for Downtown, in which downtown retailers were organized,  devised a
comprehensive plan for Baltimore’s CBD redevelopment.
To conclude,  the examples illustrate the liaison of private organizations and city departments
or city hall based on an informal arrangements concerning planning in order to revitalize
downtown. A key contribution of business associations and committees was their sponsorship
of comprehensive development plans with an emphasis on revitalization of the CBD. Private
development committees and their partnership with local public officials might led to lasting
governing coalitions (Barnekov, T.; Boyle, R.; Rich, D., 1989:45). Such close informal
relationships between the public and private sectors were common in the US. Informal public-
private alliances strongly influence urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s and thus affected
downtown revitalization significantly.
B.  Formal Partnerships
Formalization of partnerships take place through formal partnership agreements as well as
public-private institutions and corporations. Partnership agreements can be considered less
formalized than partnerships in which quasi-public or private corporations are established. A
new era of partnerships emerged in the late 1970s since public and private partners seek to
achieve formalized partnership agreements. As a result, partnerships have become a more
institutionalized part of urban development in the US (Heinz, W., 1993:129).
Partnership agreements can take many forms. However, it is always “a written statement of
the decisions governing all of the various aspects of the project” (Kirlin, J. J., 1985:20). The
contract clearly defines the responsibilities of each partner. Generally, it is a complex
document. The most common contractual agreements between the public and private sectors
are the following: Development Agreements (DA), Disposition and Development Agreements
(DDA), Ownership Participation Agreements (OPA), and Lease Agreements. In California
DAs were authorized by California State Law in 1979 (Arana, 1986:31). This legislation
authorizes localities and developers to contract for mutual benefits. A development agreement
may specify “conditions, terms, restrictions, and regulations pertaining to all aspects of a
development” (Fulton, W., 1999:352). A DDA is similar to a development agreement,
however, it is a contract between a city or city agency and developer in a redevelopment
project called for in a redevelopment plan. An OPA is struck between the city or city agency
and property owners when property is not owned by the redevelopment agency. Usually the
property owners have small parcels and the city wants particular improvements to be done.
The advantage of formal public-private partnerships is the early commitment to negotiations
with a contractual agreement at the end. Formal agreements afford security for the
participants. In this instance the private partner (developer or investor) has the assurance that
the “actions agreed on by the city would be carried out no matter what political uncertainties”
will occur. On the other hand, the agreement provides the city assurance of planning
guidelines and financial duties of the developer or investor. (Claggett, W. E., 1982:257).25
Claggett calls this “performance contracting” (Claggett, W. E., 1982:288). More specifically,
the city and private developers negotiate to reach a contract agreement that is binding on all
parties. In this instance, a contract has been used to formally define the responsibility of each
partner. This can reduce uncertainty and risk for both sectors. In conjunction with
performance contracting ‘strategic planning’ has become more important due to innovative
financing methods and new definitions of public-private responsibilities.
As already mentioned in preceding sections, equity participation has become increasingly
important for local governments in order to generate revenue. According to Arana, equity
participation “may be the most profitable revenue-raising method being used by Southern
California localities today” (Arana, 1986:31). Public entities can raise revenue while keeping
control over a development project. Equity participation encompasses two kinds of
agreements: participatory leases and equity participation agreements. With participatory
leases localities or redevelopment agencies lease public facilities or land to developers. Equity
participation agreements allow cities to invest in real estate projects. In both agreements, the
city gets a percentage of the project profits. In both cases, localities play  “a role that’s much
closer to that of a private developer” (Arana, 1986:32). Equity participation has occurred, for
instance, in efforts to develop commercial sports facilities. Whereas equity participation in
shopping malls, CDB redevelopment, and office buildings have become more frequent.
Typically, the city issues revenue bonds for the construction of the facilities. The agreements
may include sales tax participation. However, the danger is that local governments favor
commercial development that gain much sales taxes to the detriment of residential
development. “These governmental ventures [...] involve both substantial opportunity and
risk. Most of these economic development projects are carried out by public-private
partnerships, often in legal form as public, private profit, or nonprofit corporations and often
with a commingling of public and private funds” (Collmann, 1989:148). Public equity
holdings via public-private partnerships have become a common method in urban
development in the US. Cities achieve an equity position in a development project in return
for their investment.
Because in a time of resource scarcity, local governments use various kinds of leasing
arrangements whereby private capital is provided for the construction of the facility that then
will be leased back to the local government. Or local governments may lease public property
to investors and developers and thus public ownership and control of the leased land or
building is retained. Local governments may act entrepreneurial when lease payments include
a so-called “kicker” in addition to the base rate. The kicker might be one percent of the gross
income of the project. In this way, the city functions as an ordinary investor who expects
return on assets.
The establishment of quasi-public and private corporations for the cooperation of the public
and private sectors in urban development was already discussed (section II.2.b). Separate
entities for urban development have increasingly been formed since the 1980s. Cities are
mostly involved in development projects through its redevelopment agency. In general,
redevelopment agencies combine public powers with private enterprise flexibility. They have
been formed to manage redevelopment projects and negotiate with developer. Such
independent public authorities have a quiet long tradition in the US. Alternatively, quasi-
public corporations may be established in order to carry out project planning and management
for the city. Thus, they are intermediary institutions that foster and organize public-private
partnerships. On the other hand, they are often public-private partnerships by themselves as
their board consists of business representatives appointed by the mayor. Development
corporations may also be established in efforts to develop a specific project. In fact, a lot of
partnerships are project-oriented and have never been institutionalized in long term. Separate
entities have been established for projects such as a stadium, ballpark, or convention center. A26
quasi-public corporation may issue revenue bonds in order to finance the project. The
development corporation, however, may be dissolve after the project is finished.
To conclude, examples of formal intersectoral relationships can virtually be found in every
US-American city. Contractual relationships may take various forms and may be differently
institutionalized. In fact, many different formal partnerships have been developed in the US
due to a diversity in partnership contracts and institutions. Redevelopment agencies and
development corporations are unquestionable opposite to traditional public agencies. The
separation of public administration and independent agencies is  extremely strong when deal-
driven or project-driven development corporations are formed.
C.  Partnership activities
Public-private partnerships provide a means for reducing uncertainty through negotiations and
contractual arrangements. Moreover, collaborative approaches may achieve greater efficiency
in the use of public and private resources. Public-private partnerships are primarily a financial
tool for urban development.  In fact, public-private partnerships have contributed to financial
innovations  by  tailoring complex financial packages.
City governments have many powers that can be used to support development: (1) provision
of financial aid, (2) powers of taxation including the ability to abate taxes, regulations, and
zoning, (3) power of eminent domain, and (4) employment of tax-increment financing.
Different types of partnership activities are best described by Hamlin and Lyons (Hamlin, R.
E.; Lyons, T. S., 1996:37-76) and the CUED (CUED, 1978:197-199). Summarizing both
analyses result in the following set of intersectoral activities and incentives for collaboration.
Figure 3: Partnership activities
Types of activities Specific Intersectoral activities
financial debt capital such as loan guarantees, front-end
capital, (low-interest) loans, TIF, bond issues
(revenue bonds), grants; secured debt (from
financial lending institutions); federal funds
(CDBG- funds); tax incentives including
exemptions and abatements; interest
subsidies; equity financing including seed
equity; land write-downs; leases; publicly-
financed construction such as parking
garages, industrial parks, rehabilitation of
structures; direct subsidies
not-primarily financial land acquisition and assemblage (land
management); public improvements; public
sector provision of utilities and infrastructure;
Air Rights and TDR;  political
acknowledgment through highly visible
development projects27
administrative modifying building codes and zoning
requirements (zoning incentives); establishing
redevelopment authorities and quasi-public
entities to enable financing and provide
technical expertise and skilled staff; avoid
bidding processes; minimize bureaucracy
such as red tape; TIFS (tax increment finance
districts)
Source: (own draft) Hamlin, R. E.; Lyons, T. S. ,1996:37-76; CUED, 1978:197-199
One can distinguish primarily financial, not-primarily financial, and administrative incentives.
Especially financial incentives are to use in order to induce investment and focus investment
in targeted areas. Administrative incentives including land use control incentives such as
relaxing regulations and controls may be used by local governments when a project promotes
public goals. In another approach local government provides development assistance through
land acquisition, assemblage, and readjustment. This is a key role of the public sector since it
can use its ‘taking power’. The public sector can also assist technically and financially in
feasibility studies.
City governments have used a wide range of innovative techniques to finance urban and
economic development activities. Especially complex public financial incentives and
investments have increasingly been tailored to the needs of private developers and investors.
Innovative public sector leverage has encouraged a growing cooperative public/private
investment trend in urban development. The public sector has also began to assume the role of
an investment partner in joint development ventures. The increasingly complex nature of
public/private financial transactions contributed to the formalization of public/private
development planning and implementation.
A fundamental change of local government’s role in urban development took place with the
public sector’s engagement in direct debt and equity financing. It is used by the public sector
to direct credit to development projects. Traditionally, equity financing “represents an
investment of an owner or partial owner of an enterprise”, whereas debt financing “refers to
the loan being made by a bank to provide further capital to an entrepreneur” (CED,
1978:236).  Under debt-financing programs, a public entity makes or guarantees loans. Equity
investments, in contrast, are riskier for local governments as the municipality becomes a
partial owner in an enterprise or development project. Thus, the recovery of the investment by
the municipality depends on the success of the corporation or project. The public sector has
become deeply involved in debt and equity financing mostly through loans, guarantees, and
subsidies. Loan Guarantees are a means of risk-reducing to leverage investment from private
lenders. Debt financing is more widespread than equity arrangements and is a traditional
public sector incentive to the private sector. Three major kinds of debt-financing are: direct
loans, loan guarantees, and revenue bond financing. A loan guarantee is a means of lowering
the cost of credit. In that case, the local government guarantees to a private lender that a
specific portion of the loan will be paid back in case of default. Thus, the risk to the private
lender will be reduced. According to Eisinger, “the most important economic development
tool for generating low-cost capital [...] has been tax –exempt bond financing” (Eisinger,
1988:157). Bonds sold by municipalities are tax-exempt from federal taxation. Because of the
tax-exempt status of the bond interest rates paid by the municipality are low. As follows, the
costs of borrowing through tax-exempt bonds are lower for the municipality than it is through
private lenders. Cities become entrepreneurial also through limited or general partnership in
development projects and development corporations. Thus, the city has an equity position in28
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the property and is equity investor. As a limited partner, the city has no liability for operating
deficits.
D.  Summary
The preceding analysis assumes that it is difficult to find an overall typology of public-private
partnerships. Indeed, it is more useful to distinguish intersectoral partnerships concerning
specific partnership elements; that may be: first, public sector involvement and organizational
structure; second, partnership activities; and third, chief objectives and spatial foci.
Figure 4:  Formal and Informal Partnerships
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The public sector involvement is determined by the scope of intersectoral partnership
activities. I argue that the public sector involvement in urban development projects is low in
the case of administrative incentives but high when the city is engaged in development project
financing. According to Cummings, Koebel, and Whitt, the financial roles of cities in urban
development can range from “gift-giver” to “equity partner” (Cummings, Koebel, Whitt,
1989:219). Cities that hold equity positions in development projects are highly involved in
urban development. Such cities may be described as entrepreneurial cities. Besides formal and
informal intersectoral partnerships one can determine investment and social partnerships with
regard to their chief objective and spatial focus.





Investment partnerships are more widespread and visible than social partnerships in the
United States. Essentially, investment partnerships are focused on economic development in
downtown and its CBD. The projects are physical in nature and mostly highly visible.
Downtown-focused public-private partnerships are also described as elite-based and
centralized partnerships. Social partnerships, in contrast, are neighborhood-based partnerships
addressing neighborhood development, community services, housing and jobs. Such
partnerships are more “inclusive” (Squires, 1991:198) and aim at broader participation and
social distribution aside economic development. Consequently, economic development is also
an important feature for social partnerships following the thesis that the very concept of
public-private partnerships is to promote urban economic development, but the projects are
social-oriented as well. Socioeconomic revitalization comprises physical and social
rehabilitation of neighborhoods and in this regard combines place-based urban development
strategies and people-based strategies (Wagner, F. W.; Joder, T. E.; Mumphrey, A. J.,
2000:11). The federal empowerment program (EZ/EC) can be considered an appropriate
example of such “new partnership” approaches (Haider, D., 1986:139; Barnekov, 1989:38) in
the United States. In this context, third sector, nonprofit organizations have become more
important since the 1980s. An outstanding example for such neighborhood improvement
associations are Community Development Corporations (CDCs). A CDC is an organization of
neighborhood residents or organizations established to revitalize and strengthen








neighborhoods. They typically operate in low- and moderate- income neighborhoods. “Most
CDCs more or less share goals such as the empowerment of neighborhood constituencies,
community control over local businesses, industrial and residential development, the
economic improvement of poor neighborhoods and their residents, and the strengthening of
institutions that will accomplish these goals (Wiewel, Weintraub, 1990:160). The movement
of CDC has grown since the 1980s. Many CDCs are active in providing financial assistance
for the production of low-cost housing, commercial and industrial development projects, and
the encouragement of small businesses in their communities. They supply equity capital,
loans and technical assistance to businesses. Housing and rehabilitation, however, is the
primary activity of CDCs. “The work that many CDCs engage in is called gap financing”
(Wiewel, Weintraub, 1990:160). In addition, private foundations are traditionally involved in
social partnerships.
The proposed typology of public-private partnerships reflects the wide range of intersectoral
partnership activities in the US. The growing number of functional areas being addressed by
public-private partnerships includes first and foremost downtown commercial development as
well as housing, education, high-technology business, and neighborhood revitalization.  Most
critics assert that public-private partnership models in the US are broadly focus on downtown
development at the expense of neighborhood revitalization.
IV.  Case Studies
The following chapter deals with partnership approaches in the Sunshine state. For that
purpose I chose Los Angeles, San Diego and Santa Ana as case studies. The big cities of Los
Angeles and San Diego are highly engaged in public-private partnerships in urban
development. Here, public-private partnerships have been established particularly in the
context of redevelopment under the Community Redevelopment Law (Health and Safety
Code, § 3300 et seq.). Especially the City of San Diego has been engaged in intersectoral
partnership approaches. Moreover, the city can be described as highly entrepreneurial since it
has been involved in equity participation. Two development projects should provide an
overview  of the risk sharing partnership approach of the City of San Diego. Santa Ana,  in
contrast, has hardly been involved in co-development and equity participation in urban
development. The city, however, provides interesting examples of  public-private partnership
approaches on a low involvement level of the public sector as well as informal or indirect
intersectoral partnerships. Furthermore, I consider Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) as
a form of public-private partnerships. I found several examples of such public-private sectors
cooperation particularly in the City of Los Angeles and San Diego.
A.  Formal and Informal Partnerships in Santa Ana in efforts to revitalize
downtown
To understand the formation of public-private partnerships in the City of Santa Ana it is
useful to describe the evolution of the city after the World War II at first. Santa Ana is the
oldest city of  Orange County and lies 33 miles southeast of Los Angeles. Before 1965 the
city was the political, cultural, and economic center of the county. In the 1960s, however, the
economy of the city changed considerably. As the wealthy of Orange County moved to the
mountains and Newport Beach, retail in the city began to deteriorate. New centers of retail
were developed in Newport Beach (Fashion Island) and Costa Mesa (South Coast Plaza).31
Furthermore, offices, banks, and restaurants moved out of town. As a result, downtown Santa
Ana became neglected and many of the old industrial and office buildings, which dated back
to the beginning of the 20
th century, were completely empty in the 1980s. The following facts
have contributed to downtown redevelopment in Santa Ana:
•  Strong economy in Southern California,
•  Very strong mayor/leadership in town,
•  Population growth in Orange County, and the fact that
•  Orange County has been running out of land and thus greenfields have become less
important while at the same time infill and brownfield development have increase in
value.
To revitalize downtown and strengthen the city as a whole the city focused on art and culture.
The logic of downtown revitalization has been: If  artists come; people, tourist, and a
bohemian culture would follow. In this concept, artists are thought as pioneers for urban
development and social life style. In this connection, the city rediscovered its old buildings. In
fact, Santa Ana is the only oldest city left in Orange County. In comparison, Anaheim pulled
its historic buildings down around 30 years ago. Focus for downtown redevelopment has been
Fourth Street which has always been Santa Ana’s “Main Street” and most important street for
the Hispanic community. Until the 1990s with its tremendous revitalization efforts, Fourth
Street was the only lively street in downtown. As the developer Arthur Strock stated in an
interview, the city had to reinvented itself or would die.
1
The revitalization process of downtown Santa Ana began only 10 years ago at the beginning
of the 1990s. The most important features of downtown revitalization in the City of Santa Ana
have been public-private sectors cooperation and the Artist Village project in the downtown
redevelopment project area. The notion of the Artist Village as the anchor of Santa Ana’s
downtown redevelopment was born approximately 6 years ago. The Artist Village is centrally
located in the historic downtown and is now home for approximately 50 artist studios and
galleries, two live performance theaters, two restaurants, the Orange County Center for
Contemporary Art (OCCCA), a nonprofit artist run gallery, and the California State
University Fullerton (CSUF) Grand Central Art Center.
The Santa Ana Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) was established in 1973 and
downtown became the first Redevelopment Project Area in the same year. The goal was to
create a new, attractive commercial district with office, retail and residential uses. The biggest
public-private development project in Santa Ana is by far the Fiesta Marketplace. The DDA
was struck in August 1985 between the CRA and the Fiesta Marketplace Partners. Irving
Chase, a general partner of the Fiesta Marketplace Partners stated: “The Agency
[Redevelopment Agency] was instrumental and then truly provided a wonderful
public/private partnership” (City of Santa Ana, 1998:4). However, formal partnerships for
downtown revitalization on a lower level of public sector involvement is more common in
Santa Ana. That is presumably due to the size of the city with its 311,000 inhabitants.
To enhance the infusion of the arts, the CRA encouraged the reuse of vacant or underutilized
historic structures in downtown. The CRA has had “A Place for Art” as a motto for its
revitalization efforts. In this connection the CRA helped fund the renovation and expansion of
the Bowers museum, assisted in the acquisition of a site for the St. Joseph Ballet, bought the
Grand Central Art Center for the CSUF and then leased it back to the University, guaranteed a
loan for the Orange County High School for the arts, funded improvements of the Santora
Building to facilitate the establishment of a new restaurant, and funded the purchase of a
building on behalf of the OCCCA. These are examples of formal public-private or public-
                                                         
1 Interview with the developer Arthur Strock on the 20
th of October 200032
public partnerships in urban planning with a moderate involvement of the city through the
purchase of a building for a nonprofit organization, the acquisition of a site for a private
corporation, joint financing for the renovation of a museum, a leasing agreement for a
building with an obvious advantage for the lessee, a loan guarantee and so forth. The city
through the CRA has tried to lure investment and people to downtown and has helped to keep
projects going through mostly financial incentives.
Aside formal partnerships, an informal public-private partnership has contributed to
downtown revitalization. Santa Ana’s citizen and private interests pushed downtown
revitalization including the idea of an Artist Village taking SoHo, Greenwich Village in NYC,
Santa Monica, Pasadena, and Portland as example. An informal (that means not formalized
cooperation) partnership between the public and private sectors were established through a
Task Force for Art and Culture which was established in 1992 in order to encourage the arts
in downtown. While city officials and private interests worked together in the Task Force
until 1995, the idea of the Artists Village was conceived. Members of the Task Force were
Don Cribb, a city commissioner and activist, a graphic designer, a social neighborhood
activist, an artist, an architect, the Executive Director of building and planning, the Executive
Director of the Redevelopment Agency and other city staffers.
2 In the Task Force public and
private interests started taking about the concept of attracting art to downtown, looked for an
appropriate geographical area for the Artists Village, went out to neighborhoods, museums,
citizen, and property owners to get support for the idea of the Artists Village. The Task Force
for Art and Culture commissioned a feasibility study for an arts area in downtown,  which was
paid by the city developed, in 1993 and after the extremely positive study it started an
advertisement strategy for the project. Furthermore, live/work municipal codes were
developed for the Artists Village by the Task Force. The codes allow limited art uses and
live/work projects in the targeted area.  After the codes were approved by the building and
planning department and the City Council in 1994,  the rebuilding process in the 13 blocks
area could start. The Artists Village was born.
3
In general, public-private and even public-public sectors cooperation have highly contributed
to downtown revitalization in Santa Ana.  The local developer Strock, artists, the downtown
redevelopment manager, Charles View, as well as other city officials confirmed the great
influence of partnership cooperation on downtown development in Santa Ana. The Task
Force for Art and Culture further provides an excellent example of an informal partnerships
between the City of Santa Ana and its citizen in efforts to employ art as redevelopment
strategy. The discussed formal and informal partnerships in Santa Ana are investment
partnerships which aim primarily at economic development in downtown. However, the Artist
Village has already brought about social frictions since it does not take social considerations
into account. In this regard, the Hispanic majority of the city regard the Artist Village as an
artificial enclave inside Santa Ana.
B.  Business Improvement Districts
Business Improvement Districts are best defined by Houstoun:
“A Business Improvement District (BID) is an organizing and financing mechanism used by property owners
and merchants to determine the future of their retail, commercial and industrial areas. The BID is based on state
                                                         
2 Interview with Randy Au, artist and then-member of the Task Force, on the 17
th of  November 2000
3 I gathered information about the Task Force in interviews with Randy Au (November 17,2000) and Don Cribb
(November 24,2000)33
and local law, which permits property owners and merchants to band together to use the city’s tax collection
powers to ‘assess’ themselves. These funds are collected by the city and returned in their entirety to the BID and
are used for purchasing supplemental services (e.g., maintenance, sanitation, security, promotions and special
events) and capital improvements (e.g., street furniture, trees, signage, special lighting) beyond those services
and improvements provided by the city. In essence, the program is one of self-help through self-taxation.”
(Houstoun, L. O., 1997:9)
In California, the establishment of BID’s is authorized by two state laws: one which allows
for the creation of merchant based special assessment districts and one which allows for
property based districts. In both cases, a majority of business owners or commercial property
owners in a given area decide to acquire special benefits and to pay for those benefits by
themselves. In a BID as geographically defined area, supplemental services and activities as
well as area-specific programs are provided. Supplemental services and activities are those
which are not provided by the city. Mostly, BID’s pay for maintenance such as street furniture
that cannot be paid by the city due to budget constrains. The city requires that a nonprofit
corporation be designated as the agent responsible for procuring the BID improvements. The
organization is obligated to provide to the city financial reports over the use of the assessment
funds. The city is also authorized to audit and review the financial conditions of a BID. In this
way the city assists the BID with review, thus that the special assessment is used according to
the budget.
4 Consequently, the city has a determined role in the BID program. In this regard
the relationship between a city and its business association(s) can be describe as a formal
public-private partnership with low public sector involvement. Cities provide primarily
administrative support for business associations and their BID’s. The intertwined relationship
between the public sector and private interests in a BID program is shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: Organizational Chart of a BID
  Management             Marketing/Advertising Economic Development/
Physical Improvements
Media Relations Special Events
Source: Own draft
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City Council34
Business Associations and BID’s can be found in all three case study cities. The City of San
Diego even asserts that it is home of the first BID nationwide.
5 Moreover, the City of San
Diego is special about BID’s concerning its BID Council which was established in 1993 in
order to provide an umbrella organization to disseminate information, resources, assistance
and expertise to its 19 member BID’s and to foster networking efforts. Eric Symons, Senior
Public Information Officer of the Economic Development and Community Services
Department of the City of San Diego, stated in an interview that:
“BID’s are most definitely a public-private partnership in the City of San Diego.”
6
The city collects the assessment and then reimburses it to the district for expenses that follow
the guidelines of the respective district’s work plan. More specifically, the Office of Small
Business (part of San Diego’s Economic Development and Community Services Department)
administers the BID program and oversees the assessments. There are guidelines for the use
of these funds. The BID proposes how specifically the money will be used and the City
Council approves those budgets. The city’s investment in BID’s is completely separate from
these assessments. In addition to these funds, the city provides matching grant funding to each
of the 19 BID’s to ensure that each BID can afford to hire office staff to work with the
volunteer boards that direct each BID. Symons stressed:
“The city funding doesn’t stop there. We also provide CDBG funding for a variety of activities, including
physical improvements such as streetscape, lighting and landscaping. Transient Occupancy Tax revenue [TOT]
is also available through a competitive application process. This funding helps promote special events and funds
business development and retention efforts in many of the districts. On average, the City invests $ 4 to $ 6
million each year in the BID’s, which has helped to leverage another several million from BID assessments and
other fundraising activities within BID’s.”
7
Though funding is subject to BID board decisions, grant funding form the city such as TOT,
Small Business Enhancement Program or CDBG will be oversight by the city. Specific
requirements are attached by the city and therefore, organizing, planning and carrying out a
project is being done together. The best example in San Diego is the neighborhood
revitalization program. Here, street, lighting and landscaping improvements are carried out in
joint efforts. Many districts set up a landscape maintenance districts (LMD) to help pay for
ongoing maintenance of these improvements, as the city does not have the ongoing funding.
Thus, the city pay for construction and the BID’s pay to maintain the improvements. In this
way, BID's are a perfect example of pubic-private sectors cooperation in urban development.
Consequently, public-private partnerships in the context of the BID programs is not all about
funding.  Symons stated:
“City staff as well as our elected officials and their staff work closely with BID’s and the BID Council to
formulate policies, guide improvement planning and projects, and tie together a multitude of other city services
and programs that, together, benefit BID’s. One of the city’s primary goals is to revitalize older neighborhoods
and commercial districts throughout the city. BID’s provide another tool to help us work with the community to
achieve this long-term goal.”
8
Consequently, a BID partnership serves mutual goals. The public sector provides
administrative and financial support for BID’s, and BID’s, in return, help cities to achieve
public goals by revitalizing neighborhoods. According to Symons the North Park Streetscape
Improvement Project , recently completed by the City of San Diego and the North Park Main
                                                         
5 compare: www.bidcouncil.org
6 Interview with Eric Symons on the 29
th of November 2000
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Street Association, represents a prime example of a public-private partnership. The project
includes public art, sidewalk upgrades, significant landscaping and decorative lighting. The
project cost approximately $800,000, funded grants obtained by the city. The project itself
was developed through a joint comprehensive planning process including the city, the
community and the business association. Most every detail was reviewed and approved both
by the community and the city. During construction, the city worked closely with the hired
contractor and the businesses. Prior to construction, the BID voted to create a LMD to pay for
ongoing maintenance of the project. Thus, the relationship between the city and businesses
was very close. Richard Kuryb, who works for the North Park Main Street Association, also
confirmed a successful and close public-private partnership between the city and the North
Park Main Street Association.
9
The Gaslamp Quarter is another outstanding example in San Diego due to its effectiveness
and accomplishments. According to Symons,:
“As ten to 15 years ago, the district needed significant revitalization. The efforts of the business association and
the residents, city government and the Convention & Visitor Bureau have paid off. The district is absolutely
thriving and those that hadn’t seen it years ago would hardly believe what it once was. Special events are
becoming an additional draw to this successful area.”
10
Another very good example is the Adams Avenue. That district has established itself as
Antique Row with numerous antique stores, as well as a unique book-selling area. The BID
itself is responsible for coordinating the two of the largest free music festivals in Southern
California. The success of these events have positioned the Adams Avenue BID as a leader in
special event fundraising. Symons also considered the management of the district to be one of
the most entrepreneurial of all BID’s in San Diego, as they have branched out to tackle
community issues, such as actually developing a school annex  for the neighborhood.
11
In contrast to the organization of the BID program in the City of San Diego, in the City of Los
Angeles the program is administered by the Office of the City Clerk. The City Clerk serves as
a facilitator to assemble the components required to consider establishing a BID in a given
area of the city. The service operations aim at formation, establishment and administrative
activities. In this regard, the public-private sector liaison is highlighted by the city. An
important part of the public-private partnership is here the City Clerk’s assistance in
implementing activities or programs which require the coordination and cooperation of other
city departments and resources.
12 By and large, the city through the City Clerk provides a
comprehensive direct district development assistance, legislative assistance and public
relations assistance.
BID’s as a means of commercial revitalization in downtown and surrounding neighborhoods
spread also to mid-size cities in the United States. The mid-sized City of Santa Ana, for
instance, has an active downtown-based business association, the Downtown Santa Ana
Business Association (DSABA). The DSABA is a nonprofit organization funded through
annual taxes paid by businesses within the downtown BID. The DSABA and its BID was
created by the City Council and downtown business owners to implement activities to support
downtown. DSABA’s role is to prepare a budget for the City Council approval and to
implement the activities outlined in the budget. Special about the organizational structure of
the BID in Santa Ana is that the downtown development manager serves also as the DSABA
administrative director. Moreover, the downtown development agency manages the
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organizational details for the DSABA.
13 Thus, there is a clear connection between the public
and private sectors in the BID program in the City of Santa Ana.
C.  Co-development  in San Diego
As we have seen in chapter II, cities have increasingly been involved in development projects
with the private sector. They began to negotiate for a form of profit sharing in the 1970s while
at the same time expanding their “aid inventory” for development projects (Frieden; Sagalyn,
1989:137). Besides land assembly, cost write-down, and parking provision, cities began to
build more supporting facilities for instance for shopping malls. Moreover, they started to
draw on a wider range of financing techniques such as leasing arrangements, floating tax-
exempt revenue bonds, and equity participation. San Diego is a perfect example to describe
the growing importance of the public sector in public-private co-development projects.
Important features of public-private partnerships such as institutional changes which were
discussed in preceding sections can be found in this case study city as well.
Redevelopment in the City of San Diego is carried out by the City’s Redevelopment Agency.
But besides the city’s redevelopment division there are two autonomous Development
Corporations which carry out redevelopment activities in a specific geographical area. The
Centre City Development Corporation (CCDC) manages redevelopment in downtown San
Diego. The Southeastern Economic Development Corporation (SEDC) was established in
1981 to carry out redevelopment activities in southeastern San Diego. Thus, both
development corporations are quasi-public corporation, while the CCDC is the development
corporation for downtown redevelopment. Both development corporations were established to
facilitate public-private partnerships in development projects and have a broad range of
powers including securing public financing, negotiating deals with developers, and reviewing
development proposals to ensure that they meet design criteria and other public objectives
(Trimble and Rogel, 1983:19). In fact, since the 1970s it is common for cities to adjust to a
new style of deal-making and negotiating by changing the administrative system such as the
establishment of new organizations to manage downtown redevelopment. Donna Alm, public
information officer of the CCDC, stated:
“As the facilitator between the public and private sectors, everything we [CCDC] do is a public-private
partnership. The two main resources provided are the power of eminent domain and tax increment financing.
The City of San Diego often utilizes public-private partnerships to accomplish objectives; many have nothing to
do with redevelopment. They can be sometimes the only method to get public projects done, or for getting
private projects done."
14
Redevelopment activities are in their very nature public-private partnerships since DDA’s
represent some form of public-private development, or participation, or agreement. Whereas
actual co-development is far more rare. Concerning co-development in San Diego, the large
projects like Horton Plaza and the Ballpark come to mind. Both development projects are
outstanding examples of co-development in the City of San Diego and are far more
complicated than other public-private development projects.
15 San Diego is well-known for its
Horton Plaza redevelopment project, a multiuse regional shopping center including a hotel,
parking facilities, two theatres, and office space on an 11.5-acre site covering 6.5 city blocks
in downtown. The $180 million retail project was built in a public-private partnership
completed as part of the city’s redevelopment plan, and has been a catalyst for the
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revitalization of downtown San Diego (compare: ULI, 1986). For analyzing public-private
partnerships in urban development it is a perfect example of a public-private joint venture.
The Ballpark project, is a current public-private joint venture. But due to its ongoing
development process and litigation problems it is difficult to analyze. Therefore, I focus more
on the Horton Plaza project.
Like other major urban downtown in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s , downtown
San Diego suffered from disinvestment, a deteriorating tax base and a decline in population.
The city attempted to stop the exodus of residents, investments and businesses to the suburbs
and strengthen downtown by working together with the public sector in a joint venture.
Pamela Hamilton stated:
“The purpose was to bring major retail back to downtown that had once moved to Mission Valley. From this
perspective is was a risky monetary investment. It is critical that the project was so large and required the
developer to think creatively because there is not so much space in downtown like in suburban areas. Horton
Plaza represented an experiment by all means.”
16
The City of San Diego was deeply involved in the Horton Plaza project through CCDC. In
essence, CCDC was established for carrying out this huge redevelopment project and acted as
the sole negotiator between the city and the developer. The City Council approved a
redevelopment plan for the Horton Plaza, a fifteen-block area in downtown, in 1972 in order
to revitalize San Diego’s downtown. In 1974 the city selected the Ernest Hahn corporation as
developer to built a retail center including a downtown mall. Horton Plaza took a decade of
deal making. CCDC was empowered to represent the city in negotiating with the Hahn
Corporation as well as taking responsibility for planning and managing the Horton Plaza
redevelopment project. CCDC was set up to deal with developers in a businesslike way, with
an independent board of directors recruited from the business community. (Frieden; Sagalyn,
1989:129). CCDC was bargaining for a city share of the revenues from the Horton Plaza
project. In this context, the DDA set the rules for the partnership between the city and the
developer while CCDC acts as a middleman. As important feature of the deal, CCDC wrote
down the land but in exchange has received 10 percent of gross rental income in excess of
base rents from shopping mall tenants (annual payment of participation in gross rental
income), 10 percent of net cash flow from office space (annual payment of participation in
office building available cash flow), and 31 percent of gross parking revenues beyond the
amount needed to amortize the developer’s cost of building the parking structures (annual
payment of participation in parking revenue surplus).
17
Conversely, since Hahn could not get department stores for its downtown mall, the
corporation wanted a commitment from the city to build a convention center and downtown
housing as well as improve conditions for retailers and residents in town. Brought forward by
the San Diegans, Inc., a downtown-based organization of business owners, developers and
property owners, the “city council approved plans in 1976 for  4,000 houses, a marina, and a
convention center in two newly created redevelopment projects south and west of the retail
site” (Frieden; Sagalyn, 1989:139). These undertakings brought a firm deal between the City
of San Diego and the Hahn company forward.
The Horton Plaza project was considered as very risky for both the city and the developer due
to unfinished agreements and the uncertainty of proposed commitments. “The first
development agreement committed the city to finance and build a 2,000-car parking garage
but left wide open the terms on which Hahn would lease it” (Frieden; Sagalyn, 1989:142).
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Moreover, although city negotiators were not satisfied with the project plan, they postponed
decisions on design issues. The developer on the other side was taking risks as he was
uncertain whether the city will built the promised convention center and housing units. In fact,
construction of the convention center did not begin before Horton Plaza was opened in 1985.
The entire project is characterized by a significant mutually dependent construction
overlapping that can be considered as substantial different from the “control style of urban
renewal” (Frieden; Sagalyn, 1989:140). The argument that development deals are never final
was proven in San Diego. The Horton Plaza experience also shows that DDAs are partnership
agreements that allow some flexibility. Horton Plaza is a story of steady change. During the
development project several concessions on both sides had to be made. Several deals
including the profit-sharing agreement on rental income and on net cash flow from office
space as well as the parking agreement led to a complex deal between the developer and the
city. All together, “[...] the Hahn Company and the redevelopment agency amended the
development agreement five times, reconfigured the site, changed the design a dozen times,
[...]” (Hamilton, 1994:2). The essence of the deal is summarized by Frieden and Sagalyn as
follows: “As far as city negotiators were concerned, Hahn could have his redesign in
exchange for taking over increasing financial responsibilities for the project” (Frieden;
Sagalyn, 1989:150).
While becoming co-investor in the Horton Plaza project, the city adopted a highly
entrepreneurial style of urban governance. San Diego did not use federal renewal funds for the
Horton Plaza project. Nearly half of the city’s costs ($15 million) came from tax-increment
bonds (Frieden; Sagalyn, 1989:160). The Horton Plaza TIF district was defined in 1974 and it
has raised an exceptionally large amount of money into the coffers of the Horton Plaza
project. Moreover, CCDC received a loan of $9.5 million from the city (Frieden; Sagalyn,
1989:162). The rest of the city’s costs came from the project itself through land sales to the
developer, temporary leases of land and interests revenues (Frieden; Sagalyn, 1989:162).
According to Pamela Hamilton, Executive Vice President of CCDC, the city and CCDC are
receiving about $4.4 million in annual revenues from Horton Plaza at the moment; about $1.5
million in tax increment on average, about $100,00 on average in participation from overage
rents and about $2.8 million in sales tax. However, if one net out what the debt service would
be on the $33 million in bonds sold to cause Horton Plaza to occur (about $2.4 million in
annual debt service), then there is about $2 million in net revenues. All together, the city and
CCDC have received about $30 million in net revenues to date and the rate of increase in net
revenues is expected to grow.
18 The substantial increase in tax-increment is largely due to
office building and hotel development. Thus, the City of San Diego has been very successful
with its equity participation approach in this joint venture. Horton Plaza is also considered a
successful product of government and private co-development by the city and CCDC as well
as some scholars (e.g., Trimble and Rogel, 1983). For the purpose of this paper, Horton Plaza
illustrated best how the city adapted entrepreneurial strategies in urban development by taking
risks and becoming financially involved in the project in order to revitalize its neglected
downtown. According to the proposed typology in II.D.4, the Horton Plaza redevelopment
project is a model of a formal, downtown-based public-private partnerships for economic
development.
The Ballpark project is an even bigger co-development project than the showpiece joint
venture Horton Plaza.
19 The Ballpark is also a redevelopment project though it is not a
separate redevelopment project area like Horton Plaza. It is situated in the Central City
Redevelopment Project area and is managed by CCDC as well. The Ballpark project is more
than its name lets assume. In addition to a  baseball stadium which is going to be built by the
                                                         
18 Phone interview with Pamela Hamilton on the 21
st of December 2000
19 One can find a lot of information about the project including some agreements on the following web page:
www.ci.san-diego.ca.us/ballpark39
San Diego Padres, the project contains three hotels, retail and residential. Baseball stadiums
have been a very popular urban development project in the US. In fact, it is “a very sexy thing
in American cities”.
20 The project is still in its first phase which include construction of at
least 850 hotel rooms, 600,000 square feet of office space, and 150,000 square feet of retail
space.
21 The City Council approved phase I in April 1999. Two DDA’s for hotel development
have been executed so far. A proposal for a third hotel is still missing. A DDA for the mixed-
use development is still in negotiation. Pamela Hamilton who is major negotiator for the city
in the project, stated:
“The ballpark project is very complicated. It is far more complicated than the Horton Plaza project. Horton Plaza
had only been a real estate transaction  whereas a ball club is intensively involved in the ballpark project as well
as plenty single developments that are encompassed by the ballpark project. There is a lot more required and the
land covered by the project is considerably bigger.”
22
Whereas in the Horton Plaza project the developer required something from the city
(convention center and downtown housing) in addition to the contracted development, it is the
other way around in the Ballpark project. Here, the city requires a lot from the Ball Club to
make the project feasible. Thus, the DDA’s of both projects contain commitments by the
developer and the city that are pertinent to the feasibility of the project.
The investment in the $411 million multiple-use ballpark is shared as follows:
Padres/Other private sources $115 million
CCDC $  50 million
Other Investments/Port $  21 million
City of San Diego $225 million
Project Total $411 million
Consequently, the city is highly financially involved in the project. In contrast to the Horton
Plaza project, the city invests considerably more in the project than the private sector. The city
and the Padres struck a very complicated joint ownership as well as use and management
agreement that highlights the entrepreneurial strategy used by the city to create an
entertainment and sports district in downtown San Diego. According to the Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU), the agreement commits the Padres to play in San Diego for 30 years
or until the ballpark debt is paid off. Thus, this passage provides financial security for the city.
Moreover, the Padres will be responsible for all Ballpark construction cost overruns. The city
will own 70 percent of the ballpark (the Padres 30 percent), whereas at the end of 30 years the
city will own 100 percent of the facility. The Padres will have to pay $500,000 per year to the
city for rent payments. According to the joint use and management agreement, the Padres and
the city share use of the ballpark. Thus, each partner is allowed to organize own events and
will retain revenue from its own events. The city will pay 70 percent or $3.5 million of the
costs for general maintenance and operation, whichever is less.
23
As we have seen, responsibilities, financing and management of the project are highly
intertwined. Due to complicated ballpark ownership, use and capital improvement agreements
it is difficult to distinguish between public and private spheres. For instance, the capital
improvements will jointly paid by the partners. The city holds the majority interest (70%) in
the joint venture, while the Padres holds a minority interest of 30%. However, the city will
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gain a 100% ownership at the end of the lease. The city is allowed to use the Ballpark on 240
days a year (Padres: 125 days).
The project is unquestionable a sound idea, but delays due to litigation are a big problem for
the city and the Padres. The delay is considered 6 month so far. Moreover, CCDC could not
sell bonds because of the law suits. Like Horton Plaza, the Ballpark project is a perfect
example of  a formal public-private partnership for economic development of downtown.
V.  Summary of Findings and Conclusions
Initially, I intended to compare public-private partnerships in the United States and California
in particular and Germany with a focus on the Capital Berlin. In fact, partnership planning in
urban development in Germany is a new experience. Some cities including Berlin have tried
to cooperate with the private sector in urban development projects for about a decade. In order
to support partnership building in urban development new planning tools have been
established in the 1990s. I wanted to examine similarities and distinctions between the two
partnership approaches while analyzing which elements of US-American public-private
partnerships are suitable and recommendable for using in German cities? And what lessons
can be learned from the US approach in Germany? But since the federal systems including the
patterns of federal support for urban development and the nature of state bureaucracy as well
as the organization of the private sector and the planning culture is considerably different in
both countries, such an international comparison would far exceed the scope of this paper.
Even the term public-private partnership is differently defined in the US and Germany. In the
German literature, public-private corporations are predominately considered as public-private
partnership.
In the following I will give some examples of fundamental differences of public-private
partnership prerequisites in both countries. The key to public-private partnerships in
American cities has been the ability of the private sector to organize itself effectively. Not
only business organizations have a long tradition in the US but also their profound impact on
urban policies and their ability to channel their economic clout into political  power. A
substantial feature of a lot of long-standing public-private cooperation in urban development
was the leadership of the mayor. In Germany, however, the organization of the private sector
is weak. Organized business interest do not play the leading role in urban development that
they do in American cities since social welfare, community improvement and cultural
functions are funded by the state. Strong leadership to mobilize public and private powers is
more difficult to achieve due to multiparty coalitions and a less powerful influence of the
mayor. Many incentives for cooperation between the public sector and business interest are
due to the autonomy of local governments in the federal system of the U.S. Moreover, the
profound autonomy of local governments enables deal-making and negotiation between both
sectors. The incentives, however, that bring about public-private partnerships differs in
different governmental systems with different legal structures and different traditions. In this
context, Newman and Verpraet provide an interesting analysis of public-private partnership
approaches in different countries with different political systems, though they focus their
research only on Europe. They argue that public-private cooperation has emerged in many big
European cities around economic development projects. They state that national
circumstances and institutional differences have an impact on the forms partnership may take
in different countries. They argue that different types of partnerships reflect deep rooted
national traditions. By and large they distinguish between a “strong state European model”
and  a “market oriented US” model of partnerships (Newman, P.; Verpraet, G., 1999:488).41
“More generally, the ability, and willingness , to control local governments gives European
national governments a leading role in the development of partnership  (Newman, P.;
Verpraet, G., 1999:488). Though the analysis does not explain the widespread partnership
planning in highly centralized Great Britain, it gives useful explanation for the late adoption
of the partnership approach in Germany. In sum, due to different prerequisites of public-
private partnerships in the US and Germany, that makes a comparison very complicated, I
decided to focus my analysis only on urban development partnership approaches in the US.
Partnership approaches have been very important in urban development in the US for a long
time. Though the term public-private partnership first emerged in the 1970s, early examples
of public-private cooperation in urban development goes back to urban renewal. In the new
era of public-private partnerships, however, development partnerships are bigger both in
scope and complexity. The main difference between earlier and new partnership approaches,
however, is due to the departure of the federal government in urban development. Like the
City of San Diego, many local governments began to participate on an equity basis in
development projects. Equity participation means profit and loss sharing in joint ventures.
Though many localities have gained success with revenue-raising methods (e.g., San Diego
with Horton Plaza), risks are considerable high as were described in the Ballpark project in
San Diego.
Development partnerships are considered extremely critical in each case study city. Public-
private partnerships are pertinent to downtown revitalization in particular. Pamela Hamilton
from the Redevelopment Agency in San Diego stated:
“As the redevelopment program started 25 years ago, property ownership in downtown San Diego was diverse
and contradictive to large-scale developments.  At this time downtown ownership was characterized by small
parcels mostly hold by trusts and multiple owners. There was no feasible way for development and to make
major projects work. Real estate was mostly underutilized. To counteract this deteriorating situation in
downtown land assembly and revitalization of the area was needed. But the city needed a private partner for
assemblage and modernization of the area. Primarily, downtown really needed private projects such as office and
retail development and not only public projects. This was the only way of salvaging downtown and encouraging
development. The city cannot do that without public-private partnerships.”
24
However, taking Santa Ana and San Diego as example, one can observe significant
differences in the urban development strategy used by the cities in efforts to revitalize
downtown. The co-development examples in San Diego describe a highly complex and
sophisticated partnership approach. The city’s involvement in development projects is high
due to equity participation in development projects. While San Diego adopted a role of an
equity partner in urban development, the City of Santa Ana is less involved in joint ventures.
Rather, Santa Ana functions as a ‘gift giver’ in urban development projects. In this way, both
cities illustrate two types of  public sector philosophy in urban development: grant giving
versus public investment.
In particular public-private partnerships are facilitated by redevelopment activities based on
provisions of state law. Redevelopment depends very heavily on private sector involvement
since the redevelopment agency facilitates, induces and fosters development but (except in
very limited ways) does not ‘carry out’ redevelopment by actually constructing much. Rather,
it attempts to financially reduce the risk of private investment, create environments in which
the value of private redevelopment investment is protected or enhanced, and bring about
critical masses of investment that ultimately become self-sustaining. Redevelopment is largely
financed by property tax increment, so it is largely financed by its own successful attraction of
real estate development. Several partnership activities can be carried out under redevelopment
law which have been broadly used in the case studies. One interesting redevelopment project
in Los Angeles which illustrate numerous partnership activity in redevelopment very well is
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the rehabilitation and expansion of the Los Angeles Central Public Library, which included
restoring a nationally significant historic building, expanding it, returning a parking lot into
public open space, selling land and development rights, issuing tax allocation bonds backed
by a guaranteed payment by the private developer of an amount equal to tax increment. The
CRA built the library for the city, the private developer built two office buildings using
transferred density and public open space on a deck on which the city reserved ownership.
Redevelopment Agencies like the CRA in Los Angeles (CRA/LA) or quasi-public
development corporations like CCDC in San Diego are pertinent to public-private sectors
cooperation in urban development. The CRA/LA describes itself as “partnership arm of the
City of Los Angeles” to “lend a hand to investors willing to take risks for a more vibrant
city”.
25
Though public-private partnerships changed over decades, “a new tradition of social-
development partnerships” (Stewman and Tarr, 1982:95) has not developed yet. Downtown-
based economic development partnerships still dominate in the US such as Horton Plaza and
the Ballpark project in San Diego and Bunker Hill in Los Angeles. A new element of public-
private partnerships in urban development, however, is the diversification of the partners. In
the current City Heights project in the City of San Diego, for instance, the private partner of
the city is different than in other projects. Here, a charitable foundation is the private partner
in the public-private partnership. A single person owns the foundation and a developer works
as part of the foundation. The private developer is going to construct a shopping mall directed
by the foundation.  Moreover, the city and the foundation are going to work together in a park
development. That is absolutely new for San Diego.
There are several examples of innovative approaches of foundation involvement in public-
private partnerships for economic development and urban revitalization. Foundations are
nonprofit organizations that might have a profound impact on urban revitalization particularly
neighborhood development. Nonprofit organizations and particularly foundations have
increasingly become more important in redevelopment efforts especially in older towns in the
East and Midwest of the US. According to the CED, private foundations use two basic
instruments to contribute to revitalization: “grants” and “program-related investments” (CED,
1982:53). Monetary contributions are common and typically made through company
foundations. For instance, the Mellon Foundation in Pittsburgh, made gifts to the city to foster
redevelopment and was even involved in redevelopment actively. Foundations have also been
pertinent to redevelopment in Minneapolis and Saint Paul (Brandl, J.; Brook; R., 1982:174-
198). Essential are here the Dayton-Hudson Foundation and the McKnight Foundation. The
Dayton-Hudson Foundation is a Minneapolis-based company foundation that first developed
a neighborhood development project and then funded the local community development
corporation. The neighborhood partnership was a rather traditional corporate philanthropic
effort of a foundation. In contrast, the McKnight Foundation was substantially involved in a
partnership extending the traditional role of foundations in urban redevelopment. Instead of
only committing grants to redevelopment projects, the McKnight Foundation invested in an
urban development project. The foundation embarked on a more “aggressive philosophy of
philanthropy” (Brandl, J.; Brook; R., 1982:184). More specifically, the foundation undertook
a program-related investment. That is, instead of a grant, an investment loan made to the
development project and these monies were recouped and returned to the foundation to be
used again (compare: Brandl, J.; Brook; R., 1982:184). Hence the city and the foundation
embarked as partners on a project in that the foundation made significant investments. The
Ford Foundation is also involved in program-related investments through loan guarantees and
funds for enterprises. “A unique organization that departs from the traditional private
foundation model is the Enterprise Foundation” (CED, 1982:54). The foundation owns the
Enterprise Development Corporation. Profits from this corporation are used for housing
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programs for low-income people. The examples describe a new role of foundations in urban
revitalization through direct involvement beyond the traditional philanthropic efforts. Pamela
Hamilton assumes that this kind of public-private partnership will be happen more in San
Diego in the next years.
26
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